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INTRODUCTION
When Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
commonly known as the Clean Water Act,' it established a pollution
control regime that imposed a baseline level of technology-based pol-
lution control, and was designed to ensure that water quality would
not fall below certain standards.2 Twenty-five years after the enact-
ment of the Clean Water Act, success may be claimed with regard to
technology-based controls.3 Achieving water quality standard (WQS)
compliance has proved much more difficult.4 Indeed, evaluated from
a variety of perspectives, the enforcement of the water quality-based
system of pollution control must be viewed as a failure.
5
In light of this failure, this Article considers whether the Clean
Water Act permits citizen suit enforcement of state WQSs and
whether allowing such suits constitutes good public policy. The Arti-
cle concludes that the text, legislative intent, and broad purpose of the
Act only allows citizen suits when compliance with state WQSs is a
condition of a point source's National Pollution Discharge Elimina-
tion System (NPDES) permit. Only in this circumstance is it good
public policy to allow citizen suits to enforce WQSs.
The Article begins its analysis by describing the regulatory struc-
ture of the Clean Water Act and focusing particularly on how the Act
was designed to protect the quality of the nation's waters. Several
provisions of the Act require that permits allowing discharges into wa-
ters include limitations that are more stringent than those normally
required by the applicable technology-based standards. The Article
also discusses how and why this scheme for ensuring WQS compliance
has failed.6 Empirical evidence indicates that many of America's wa-
terways fail to meet the applicable WQSs. This is in part because the
1. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994)).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 264 (2d ed. 1994)
(suggesting that a "regulatory accomplishment" of the Clean Water Act is that "permits
[have been] issued to more than 64,000 industrial facilities, generally requiring more than
90% removal of uncontrolled discharges."); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMEN-
TAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE & POLICY 874 (2d ed. 1996) (stating that the Clean
Water Act "has produced dramatic reductions in discharges of water pollutants from point
sources.").
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part II.A.
1997]
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Act has not been implemented and administered in a manner that en-
sures that WQSs are met. Moreover, even if the Act were imple-
mented more effectively, it would be quite difficult to ensure that
WQSs are met.
After describing the degraded quality of waters, notwithstanding
twenty-five years of technology-based emissions limitations on point
sources, the Article considers the role that direct citizen enforcement
of WQSs might play in promoting WQS compliance. In a recent con-
troversial decision, Northwest Environmental Advocates v. Portland,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a citizen suit may be
brought to enforce WQSs. 7 After describing the Ninth Circuit deci-
sion and the strong dissenting views of some members of the court,8
this Article considers the legal issue of whether and under what cir-
cumstances the Clean Water Act authorizes citizens to enforce
WQSs.9 It then discusses whether and when such actions ought to be
permitted as a matter of public policy.' 0 The Article concludes that
citizen suit enforcement of WQSs should be allowed only when the
defendant source's NPDES permit requires WQS compliance as a
permit condition. Although this is a somewhat limited scope, enforce-
ment in that circumstance should help to improve water quality in
some cases. More importantly, however, the availability of citizen
suits should help to encourage all interested parties to transform the
WQSs for waterways into specific effluent limitations for the point
sources along those waterways, and to include more stringent emis-
sions limitations in the point sources' NPDES permits. Compliance
with these specific limitations will be easier to monitor and evaluate
than is compliance with WQSs. Penalties for noncompliance will also
be fairer to permitted point sources.
I
THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT1 1
This section describes how the Clean Water Act is structured to
protect the quality of the nation's waters. After describing the basic
regulatory regime adopted in 1972, which focused on technology-
based limitations on discharges, the Article will discuss how Congress
sought to supplement this approach by requiring the adoption of
7. Northwest Environmental Advocate v. Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 981 (9th Cir. 1995),
cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 2550 (1996).
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
11. Portions of this part of the Article closely parallel portions of my previous Article,
which considers state certification of compliance with WQSs. See Michael P. Healy, The
Attraction and Limits of Textualism: The Supreme Court Decision in PUD No. 1 of
Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 5 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 382, 405-10 (1996).
[Vol. 24:393
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WQSs to further limit emissions from point sources. Indeed, when
Congress amended the Clean Water Act in 1987, it employed water
quality-based limitations as a means for ensuring that waters are pro-
tected from toxic pollutants. The discussion that follows will therefore
illustrate that the Clean Water Act places great importance on WQSs
and is structured to ensure that they are met.
A. The Function of WQSs in the Clean Water Act 12
Congress enacted the basic regulatory structure now evident in
the Clean Water Act as part of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Amendments of 1972.13 In the 1972 Act, Congress substantially re-
vised the nation's program for water pollution control, which had pre-
viously been governed by the Water Quality Act of 1965.14 The 1965
Act had relied principally on state-established WQSs to define the
clean water goals and standards.' 5 The 1965 Act proved to be ineffec-
tive in controlling water pollution. 16 Congress therefore decided to
change the WQS-based system to one involving mandatory technol-
ogy-based effluent limits for point sources of pollution.'
7
The regulatory scheme adopted in 1972 sought to improve water
quality primarily by limiting discharges into regulated waters through
technology-based controls and setting a goal of zero discharge of pol-
lutants.18 When it adopted this technology-based regulatory scheme,
Congress also established the NPDES permitting system as the "pri-
mary mechanism" for imposing those controls and their related efflu-
ent limits. 19 Accordingly, the Act requires that before a point source
12. A much more detailed discussion of the role that state WQSs play under the
Clean Water Act is presented in Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water
Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1167 (1983).
13. Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
14. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903.
15. FREDERICK ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY
354 (2d ed. 1990) ("The heart of the 1965 Act's regulatory program was water quality
standards.").
16. See id. at 354-55; U. S. ENVrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, TRAINING MANUAL FOR
NPDES PERmrr WRrrERS 1-4 to 1-5 (March 1993) [hereinafter NPDES TRAINING MAN-
UAL]. This ineffectiveness resulted from inaction by the state and inadequate federal en-
forcement authority. See PERCIVAL, supra note 3, at 881-82.
17. See NPDES TRAINING MANUAL at 1-5 (describing the shift in regulatory focus
accomplished by the 1972 statute); S. CONF. REP. No. 92-1236 (1972) reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776 (accompanying the 1972 FWPCA) ("The legislation recommended by
the Committee proposes a major change in the enforcement mechanism of the Federal
water pollution control program from water quality standards to effluent limits.").
18. See ANDERSON, supra note 15, at 355-56; cf, Westvaco Corp. v. United States
EPA, 899 F.2d 1383, 1384 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Unlike technology-based limitations, water
quality standards are not developed based on an evaluation of the capability of pollution
control technologies but on the physical attributes of the water segment necessary to sup-
port the designated uses.").
19. NPDES Training Manual, supra note 16, at 3-3:
1997]
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may discharge pollutants into waters of the United States, the source
must obtain an NPDES permit. 20 The permit limits the amount of
pollution that a source may discharge into the receiving waters, based
on the source's technological capabilities. 2'
Notwithstanding its new focus on technology-based limitations,
Congress decided to include water quality-based controls in the 1972
Act as a supplemental limit on pollution.2 2 The Act therefore includes
a provision requiring states to define WQSs, followed by federal re-
view and approval. 23 In the years since Congress shifted from a water
quality-based system to a technology-based system of regulation, Con-
gress has never abandoned WQSs as an important tool for controlling
water pollution. The Water Quality Act of 1987, for example, "placed
greater emphasis on attaining state water quality standards. '24 As will
be discussed in greater detail below, the 1987 Act sought to improve
the control of toxic water pollution by requiring compliance with
more specific, numerical water quality criteria25 and by requiring
Effluent limitations are the heart of the NPDES permit. They act as the primary
mechanism to control the discharges of pollutants to waters of the United States.
In general, the majority of the permit writer's time is spent determining and de-
veloping appropriate effluent limitations based on technology and water quality
factors.
20. Pursuant to the Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311 and 1342, a point source is
required to obtain a permit before it may discharge pollutants into waters of the United
States. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). The Act defines a "point source" broadly to
"mean[ ] any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance." Id. The definition specifi-
cally includes such conveyances as a "pipe, ditch, [or] channel." Id.
21. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1-3).
22. Id. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
23. Id. § 1313(c)(2) states that WQSs:
[S]hall be such as to protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of
water and serve the purposes of this [Act]. Such standards shall be established
taking into consideration their use and value for public water supplies, propaga-
tion of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and
other purposes, and also taking into consideration their use and value for
navigation.
24. Westvaco Corp., 899 F.2d at 1385; accord Hecla Mining Co. v. EPA, 12 F.3d 164,
165 (9th Cir. 1993). See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1318
(9th Cir. 1990) (stating that in 1987, Congress decided that "a renewed emphasis on water
quality-based standards was necessary.").
25. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(B); H. CoNF. REP. No. 90-1004, at 129 (1986):
Subsection (d) requires that during State review, revision, or adoption of water
quality standards, the State must adopt criteria for all priority toxic pollutants for
which water quality criteria have been published under section 304(a). The
State's criteria are to be based on specific numerical criteria. Where numerical
criteria are not available, the State shall use biological monitoring or assessment
methods.
See also H.R. REP. No. 102-839, at 72 (1992) stating that:
It is also the Committee's intent that groundwater should be protected to ensure
that groundwater that is closely hydrologically connected to surface waters does
not interfere with the attainment of surface water quality standards, which is nec-
essary to protect the integrity of associated ecosystems. The beneficial uses will
be determined under applicable state law, and may include, but are not limited to,
agricultural, industrial, commercial, and drinking water uses.
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states to develop "individual control strategies" for waters that fail to
comply with those numerical criteria for toxic pollutants.26 In the
1987 Act, Congress also codified a policy that EPA had developed to
prevent degradation of water quality.27 That policy was intended to
ensure the maintenance of water quality sufficient to support existing
uses of the waters.28
The preceding discussion has illustrated that, although the Clean
Water Act relies on technology-based effluent limits on point sources
as the primary means of protecting the nation's waters, the Act con-
tinues to recognize that state WQSs play an important supplementary
role in protecting and enhancing the quality of those waters. A lead-
ing commentator has noted that the technology and water quality-
based standards established by the Act "should be recognized as re-
flecting fundamentally conflicting regulatory philosophies. '29 Tech-
nology-based standards are based on the source's technological
capacity to control pollution, while water quality-based standards are
based on the environmental effect of the discharged pollution.
B. The Content of State WQSs
EPA regulations under the Clean Water Act provide that state
WQSs must include three core "elements. ' 30 The standards must in-
clude "[u]se designations" for waters subject to the Act,31 "[w]ater
quality criteria sufficient to protect the designated uses, '32 and an ac-
ceptable "antidegradation policy."' 33 These elements are intended to
be broadly protective of the quality of a state's waters. Each element
will be discussed in greater detail below.
EPA regulations relating to the state's designation of uses give
states the authority to define those uses within established con-
Congress also amended the Clean Water Act in 1977. Those amendments modified signifi-
cantly the technology-based regulatory scheme, see Gaba, supra note 12, at 1186 n.104, but
"left the water quality standards program unchanged. Id. at 1186.
26. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314().
27. See id. § 1313(d)(4)(B).
28. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (1994). This antidegradation component of state WQSs is
described infra in Part II.B.
29. RODGERS, supra note 3, at 259.
30. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (1994). For a general discussion of state WQS setting, see
American Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1993). One court has held
that:
[T]he content of water quality standards cannot ordinarily be challenged through
a citizen's suit. An administrator's duty to approve or promulgate some water
quality standards might be "nondiscretionary" within the meaning of
§ 1365(a)(2), but the content of the standards is certainly at least somewhat dis-
cretionary with the EPA.
Scott v. Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 995 (7th Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted).
31. 40 C.F.R. § 131.6(a) (1994).
32. Id. § 131.6(c).
33. Id. § 131.6(d).
19971
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straints.34 For example, EPA regulations foreclose uses that would al-
low discharges of plainly dangerous levels and types of pollutants.35
The regulations also ensure that designated uses are at least as protec-
tive of water quality as existing uses. 36
Water quality criteria, meanwhile, are defined by the state and
reviewed by EPA in light of the uses designated by the state.37 The
criteria are required to "represent[ ] a quality of water that supports a
particular use. When criteria are met, water quality will generally pro-
tect the designated use."' 38 The criteria may be "expressed as constitu-
ent concentrations, levels, or narrative statements. '39 According to
the NPDES Training Manual, "[n]arrative criteria are statements that
describe the desired water quality goal, such as, 'All State waters
must, at all times and flows, be free from substances that are toxic to
humans or aquatic life.'" 40  In recent years, EPA has increasingly
shown an interest in strengthening state water quality criteria in an
effort to promote greater protection of water resources and the bio-
logic resources that depend on those waters.41
34. See id. § 131.10.
35. Id. § 131.10(a) ("In no case shall a State adopt waste transport or waste assimila-
tion as a designated use.").
36. See id. §§ 131.10(g-h).
37. See id. § 131.11 ("States must adopt those water quality criteria that protect the
designated use.").
38. Id. § 131.3(b). State WQSs may be quite significant in their potential impact on
discharges from point sources. See Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733, 741 (D.
N.M. 1993) (discussing WQS for arsenic that is more stringent than the existing back-
ground level for that toxin in the waterway); In re Miami-Dade Water & Sewer Auth.
Dep't, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 40,034, 40,035 (E.P.A. E.A.B. July 27, 1992) stat-
ing that:
For the purposes of this appeal, a key aspect of Florida's toxicity standard is that
the effluent is to be tested at precisely 30% full strength. The toxicity testing
required by the standard, therefore, does not reflect the actual dilution that will
take place once the effluent mixes with the receiving waters.
39. 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b).
40. NPDES TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 16, at 6-3 ("To supplement numeric crite-
ria for toxicants, all states have also adopted narrative criteria for toxicants.").
41. For example, following the lead of certain states, EPA has encouraged other states
to develop new water quality criteria that will ensure protection of the ecosystems that
depend on the regulated waterway. See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n Hydropower
Licensing Program: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Env't, Energy and Natural Re-
sources of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 102d Cong. 88 (1993) for the statement
that:
EPA has recently begun to emphasize that States should also include more spe-
cific criteria for habitat protection, criteria to help prevent contamination of sedi-
ments and criteria for the protection of wildlife. Some States are way ahead of us
on this and we are using them as examples for other States to move forward.
(statement of Martha G. Prothro, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Water, U.S.
Envtl. Protection Agency). See also NPDES TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 16, at 6-3
("The science that forms the basis of water quality criteria development is constantly
evolving. For example, two new areas where criteria are being developed include biologi-
cal and sediment criteria.").
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The third core WQS element, an antidegradation policy, must
meet minimum requirements established by EPA regulations. 42 These
requirements include the full protection of both existing uses43 and
"high quality waters constitut[ing] an outstanding National re-
source. '44 The antidegradation policy must also provide for some,
more limited, protection of other waters where quality exceeds the
level needed to protect existing uses. 45
C. WQSs and the Clean Water Act Scheme for NPDES Permitting
This section describes the five regulatory devices that Congress
has included in the Clean Water Act in an attempt to ensure compli-
ance with state WQSs, and particularly those standards concerned
with toxic pollutants. These devices, which are largely redundant,
demonstrate the extent to which the Act seeks to protect water quality
against degradation.
1. Section 301's "More Stringent Limitations" Requirement
When it adopted the technology-based regulatory approach in
1972, Congress understood that the statutory scheme was incomplete
in its protection of waters affected by pollution:
Congress recognized that even if all the firms discharging pollutants
into a certain stream segment were using the best available technology
[controls], the stream still might not be clean enough to meet the
water quality standards set by the states. To deal with this problem,
Congress supplemented the "technology-based" limitations with
"water-quality-based" limitations. 46
Section 301(b)(1)(C) of the Clean Water Act requires that each
NPDES permit include "any more stringent limitation[s], including
those necessary to meet water quality standards, treatment standards,
or schedules of compliance, established pursuant to any State law or
regulation. ' '47
42. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a).
43. Id. § 131.12(a)(1).
44. Id. § 131.12(a)(3).
45. Id. § 131.12(a)(2).
46. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1317 (9th Cir. 1990)
(citations omitted).
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C). EPA has broadly construed this language. See In re
Miami-Dade Water & Sewer Auth. Dep't, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 40,036
(citation omitted), where the Environmental Appeals Board stated that it:
[Interpret[s] the section as requiring a permit limitation to ensure compliance not
just with the three types of State standards listed in the statute but, as also pro-
vided in the statute, with any more stringent 'State law or regulations' that might
be violated by the discharge. The three types of standards listed in the statute-
water quality standards, treatment standards, and schedules of compliance-are
merely examples of a larger class of State requirements that might trigger the
need for a permit limitation under section 301(b)(1)(C).
1997]
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The Act thus provides that "[o]nce water quality standards have
been set, NPDES permit limitations must be established to assure
compliance, regardless of the availability or effectiveness of treatment
technologies. ' 48 These tightened NPDES limitations will be referred
to throughout this Article as "more stringent limitations. ' '49 One
court has summarized the basic effect of this regulatory structure as
follows: "Of course, the water quality standards by themselves have
no effect on pollution; the rubber hits the road when the state-created
standards are used as the basis for specific effluent limitations in
NPDES permits. '50
As was discussed previously, WQSs, and more specifically water
quality criteria, can take a variety of forms, including narrative stan-
dards.51 The more stringent limitations requirement of section
301(b)(1)(C) also applies to qualitative and narrative state WQSs.52
Indeed, EPA has promulgated regulations that describe three methods
for translating narrative WQSs into defined permit limits on the dis-
EPA regulations also include a prohibition against issuing a permit to a point source
"[w]hen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water
quality requirements of all affected states." 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d). This prohibition also
applies to state administered permit programs. See id. § 123.25 (a)(1). Forty or so states
currently have authority to administer the NPDES permit program. See Water Pollution:
Authority Awarded to Louisiana by Agency Over NPDES Discharge, Monitoring Program
27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1006 (August 30, 1996) [hereinafter LA NPDES Monitoring].
48. Westvaco Corp. v. EPA, 899 F.2d 1383, 1384 (4th Cir. 1990).
49. Congress provided that any more stringent limitations on point sources that were
needed to meet state water quality standards were to be included in permits by July 1,
1977. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C). This deadline was intended to give permit writers an
opportunity to identify the necessary permit requirements. See In re J&L Specialty Prod-
ucts Corp., 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 40,230, 40,233 (E.P.A. E.A.B. June 20, 1994)
("as a general rule, NPDES permits issued after July 1, 1977, must require compliance with
water quality-based effluent limitations immediately upon the effective date of the per-
mit"). See id. at 40,234 ("Once the grace period has lapsed. EPA must ensure that all
permits contain limitations necessary to meet whatever state water quality standards are in
effect at the time of permit issuance, regardless of when [i.e., before or after July 1, 1977]
the standards were adopted or revised." (citation omitted)).
50. American Paper Inst. Inc. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Cf. Scott v.
Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 995 (7th Cir. 1984) stating that:
Water quality standards are not themselves directly enforced by the EPA.
Rather, permits prescribing conditions are issued for individual sources of pollu-
tants. CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342. If the conditions of a permit are violated,
the EPA may issue a compliance order or bring a civil action against the violator.
CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319.
(footnote omitted).
51. See supra Part I.B.
52. American Paper Inst., 996 F.2d at 350 ("On its face, section 301 imposes this strict
requirement as to all standards-i.e., permits must incorporate limitations necessary to
meet standards that rely on narrative criteria to protect a designated use as well as stan-
dards that contain specific numeric criteria for particular chemicals."); U.S. Envtl. Protec-
tion Agency, National Pollution Discharge Elimination System; Surface Water Toxics
Control Program, 54 Fed. Reg. 23,868, 23,871 (1989) ("effluent limits ... must achieve any
state narrative water quality criteria as well as numeric water quality criteria.").
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charge of pollutants.53 Those regulations were upheld in a legal chal-
lenge as a reasonable exercise of EPA's gap filling responsibilities
under the Act.54 As a result, the effluent limitations included in a
source's NPDES permit may be based on technology-based standards
or on numerical or narrative water quality-based standards or on a
combination of these standards.
2. The Total Maximum Daily Load Requirement
Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act supplements the section
301 more stringent limitations requirement by establishing a four step
process for reducing point source pollutant discharges when the re-
ceiving waters violate the state's WQSs. 55 The example of the Colum-
bia River will be used throughout this section to illustrate the
operation of section 303(d).
The first step of the process established under section 303(d), re-
quires states to "identify those waters which, taking into account tech-
nology-based reduction of pollutant discharge, will fail to meet the
water quality standard established for those waters. ' 56 States were
53. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.4(d)(1)(vi)(A-C); see also 54 Fed. Reg. 23,868, 23,875 ("State
narrative water quality criteria provide the legal basis for establishing effluent limits under
paragraphs (d)(1)(v) and (d)(1)(vi) of today's regulations."); NPDES TRAINING MANUAL,
supra note 16, at 6-6 to 6-7 ("EPA's regulation at 40 CFR 122.44(d)(1) establishes grounds
for determining if there is an excursion of the numeric or narrative water quality criteria.
At a minimum, the permitting authority must make this determination at each permit reis-
suance and must develop permit limits that will control the discharge.").
54. See American Paper Inst., 996 F.2d at 353 (footnote omitted), where the court
stated that:
[T]he agency's initiative seems a preeminent example of gap-filling in the interest
of a continuous and cohesive regulatory regime; the EPA has plugged an obvious
hole in the CWA scheme in a way that is both reasonable and consistent with (1)
Congress' long-standing directive that permits contain limitations necessary to
meet all water quality standards and (2) Congress' more recently expressed pref-
erence, evident in section 303(c)(2)(B), for numeric criteria. In sum, we see no
problem with the agency's efforts.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1994).
56. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Fox, 909 F. Supp. 153, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(d)(1)(A)-(B)).
The text of the Clean Water Act listing requirement has raised two issues about its
proper scope. First, the statute specifically refers only to the listing of waters that are
impaired due to the inadequacy of best practicable technology, a technology-based stan-
dard does not apply to toxic pollutants. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A). Based on this text,
one court of appeals had suggested in dicta that the Act did not require states to list waters
where quality is impaired by toxics. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d
1314, 1322 n.9 (9th Cir. 1990):
EPA suggests that prior to the enactment of section 304(1), states already were
required, albeit without a statutory deadline, to submit the information re-
quested. It cites CWA § 303(d), but that section requires states to identify only
those waters for which limitations based on the best practicable technology would
not be stringent enough to implement the water quality standards. Those waters
for which limitations based on the more demanding best available technology-
the required level of technology to control toxics-were insufficient did not have
to be listed.
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required to complete this listing of water quality-limited waters by the
middle of 1974 and to update the listing "from time to time thereaf-
ter."' 57 As an example, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho have listed
the Columbia River as a water quality-limited water because levels of
dioxin in the river exceeded the applicable WQSs.5 8
The second step in the section 303(d) process involves determin-
ing the total maximum daily load (TMDL) for each impaired water
That court later held, however, that EPA had acted reasonably in interpreting the listing
requirement to apply to waters impaired by toxics. See Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v.
Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517, 1527 for the statement that:
The EPA argues that "[w]e interpret section 1313(d) as requiring TMDLs where
existing pollution controls will not lead to attainment of water quality standards."
We take this as an assertion that when a state has listed a water as impaired by
toxic pollutants, the EPA has authority to implement TMDLs for that toxic pollu-
tant under § 1313(d) even before technological limitations have been developed
and implemented pursuant to § 1311(b)(1)(A) or (B). We hold that the EPA's
interpretation is reasonable and not contrary to congressional intent.
The second uncertainty about the scope of the listing requirement is whether listing is
required only after technology-based standards have been established and a determination
has been made that those standards are inadequate to protect water quality. The Ninth
Circuit has suggested in dictum that the listing of waters impaired by non-toxic pollutants is
not required until after technology-based standards have been established and shown to be
inadequate. See Clarke, 57 F.3d at 1528. See also 4 LIBRARY OF CONoRESS, CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERV., ENvTL. POLICY Div., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN
WATER Acr OF 1977: A CONTINUATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT at 1405 (1978) [hereinafter A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
A district court has rejected this narrow reading of the requirement, concluding that EPA's
broad interpretation was reasonable because the Act mandated the listing of impaired wa-
ters well before the statutory deadline for instituting technology-based standards. See Di-
oxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Rasmussen, 37 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1845, at *4 (W.D.Wash.
1993), affd, 57 F.3d 1517 (9th Cir. 1995):
[T]he Act contemplated the issuance of the first TMDL's well before the July 1,
1977 deadline for the establishment of best practicable technology effluent limita-
tions, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A), or the deadline of March 31, 1989 for the estab-
lishment of effluent limitations based on the best available technology
economically feasible. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(2). These terms reinforce the notion that
TMDL's were to be undertaken swiftly if water quality standards were being
violated.
See also, id. at *3 ("Congress did not write that a state 'shall only' identify waters as requir-
ing a TMDL if technology-based effluent limitations are not stringent enough, and the
Court will not read into this section such a prohibition.").
57. See Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr., 37 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at *4:
The Act required states to identify water requiring TMDL's and set appropriate
loads for those waters within 180 days after the EPA first identified the pollutants
suitable for TMDL's, and from time to time thereafter. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2).
The pollutants suitable for TMDL's were to be identified within one year after
October 18, 1972, and from time to time thereafter. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(2).
But see Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 983 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1994), which
stated that "the first such submission [of the listing of impaired waters] was due no later
than June 26, 1979," because that date fell "180 days after the date of publication of the
first identification of pollutants under § 1314(a)(2)(D)."
58. See Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d at 1520 ("Oregon, Washington,
and Idaho also identified the Columbia River as 'water quality limited' pursuant to
§ 1313(d)(1)(A), finding that the levels of dioxin being discharged into the Columbia River
violated the applicable state water quality standards.").
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listed by the state. A TMDL defines the maximum amount of a pollu-
tant that a body of water can receive from all point and nonpoint
sources each day before a violation of a state WQS will occur.59 A
TMDL is required for each pollutant that is impairing a receiving
water.60 In drafting the Act, Congress recognized that defining
TMDLs may be complex and inexact, particularly when scientific
studies are unavailable. Congress therefore specifically allowed states
to account for scientific uncertainty and permitted them to provide for
a "margin of safety" when setting TMDLs.61
In the case of the Columbia River, a TMDL was established for
dioxin to ensure compliance with the applicable water quality crite-
ria.62 Interestingly, that limit on the total mass or load of dioxin that
could be discharged into the Columbia River each day was designed
59. See Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. 1422, 1424 (W.D. Wash. 1991):
TMDLs are the greatest amount of a pollutant the water body can receive daily
without violating a state's water quality standard. The TMDL calculations help
ensure that the cumulative impacts of multiple point source discharges are ac-
counted for, and are evaluated in conjunction with pollution from other nonpoint
sources.
See also Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d at 1520:
A TMDL defines the specified maximum amount of a pollutant which can be
discharged or "loaded" into the waters at issue from all combined sources. Thus a
TMDL represents the cumulative total of all "load allocations" which are in turn
best estimates of the discrete loading attributed to nonpoint sources, natural
background sources, and individual waste load allocations ("WLAs"), that is, spe-
cific portions of the total load allocated to individual point sources.
See generally NPDES TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 16, at 6-9.
60. See Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d at 1524 ("regulations pertaining
to TMDL implementation specifically provide that TMDLs may be developed on a specific
pollutant basis, 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(c)(1)(ii)").
61. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Fox, 909 F. Supp. at 157:
This enactment by Congress of specific deadlines, to the day, demonstrates a con-
gressional intent that TMDLs be established promptly. Although these tight
deadlines might mean that initially established TMDLs would be based on less
than ideal data, that fact was considered and addressed by Congress, as demon-
strated by the statutory direction to use "a margin of safety which takes into ac-
count any lack of knowledge." Id. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
See also Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. at 1429 n.8 (citation omitted),
where the court stated that:
In addressing concern about what happens if the State or EPA does not have
enough data to establish a scientifically precise TMDL, [EPA Region X's Chief of
the Office of Water Planning, Thomas Wilson] notes that the statute builds in a
margin of safety requirement to be used to account for any lack of knowledge.
In other words, Congress says ignorance is no excuse for inaction. Just add a
margin of safety to compensate for the lack of knowledge and keep moving. No
other program has such a strong statutory endorsement for action in the face of
an incomplete database.
62. See Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Rasmussen, 37 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1845, at
*1 (W.D. Wash. 1993):
[T]he EPA analyzed the flow volumes at various points in the River to determine
the River's loading capacity, which represents the total maximum daily load of
dioxin that could be released into the river without causing the concentration of
dioxin to exceed 0.013 ppq. The EPA calculated that only 5.97 milligrams per day
could be released ....
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to ensure compliance with a standard set at so low a concentration
that violations of the standard may not have been detectable. 63 In
other words, an important practical effect of the extremely low con-
centration defined by the water quality criteria is that it necessitated a
very low TMDL for dioxin.
States were required to submit their initial TMDLs in the middle
of 1974 at the same time they submitted their initial list of impaired
waters. 64 States are required to establish and periodically update
TMDLs for all of their listed water quality-limited waters based on
their own priority rankings.65 Each state submits its TMDLs, along
with its list of impaired waters, to EPA.66 EPA is required to review
the submission and decide within thirty days whether the submission
is sufficient to ensure that state WQSs will be met.67 If EPA con-
cludes that the submission is inadequate, the agency must establish
TMDLs itself.68
63. See Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Be-
cause dioxin is immeasurably diluted at a concentration of 0.013 parts per quadrillion, the
total maximum daily load is a regulatory device applied to control how much dioxin the
pulp mills discharge into the water, rather than what can be measured in the water after
the discharges.").
64. See § 1313(d)(1)(D)(2) (1994).
65. See Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner, 20 F.3d at 983:
Under the statutory scheme, states are required to identify the specific waters that
remain polluted despite the point source controls, and designate them as 'water
quality limited.' These states are then required to establish a priority ranking for
their water quality limited segments, and establish TMDLs ... according to that
ranking. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(d)(1)(A), (C). The Act requires the states to develop
these lists of water quality limited segments and TMDLs and submit them to the
EPA periodically.
See also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Fox, 909 F. Supp. at 156:
The states must then prioritize those waters that are identified as failing to meet
the standards, and develop water-quality-based controls in order to meet the stan-
dard. A water-quality-based control is designed to determine the maximum
amount of particular pollutants the water can absorb and still meet the standard,
and then to apportion that maximum amount among the various sources of pollu-
tion in order to control the pollution.
See also Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d at 1520 ("Once the states had made
this finding under § 1313(d)(1)(A), the states, pursuant to § 1313(d)(1)(C) . . .were re-
quired to establish a Total Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL") for dioxin.") (citation
omitted).
66. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Adamkus, 1991 WL 47374, at *1 (N.D. I11. 1991) ("The
State is required to submit the identity of WQLSs and TMDLs to the EPA for review.").
67. See id. ("The EPA then determines whether the States' submissions are adequate
to implement the relevant water quality standards."); Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner,
20 F.3d at 983 ("Upon receipt of the state's listings, the CWA requires the EPA to review
the state's submissions within 30 days and either approve or disapprove them.").
68. See Adamkus, 1991 WL 47374, at *1 ("If the EPA disapproves of the state's identi-
fication of water quality limited segments or its listing of TMDLs, the agency must estab-
lish its own list of water quality limited segments and TMDLs within 30 days. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(d)(2)."). In fact, EPA made the TMDL determination for dioxin in the Columbia
River at the request of the affected states. See Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57
F.3d at 1520 ("the states requested the EPA to issue the proposed and final TMDL as a
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Courts have also interpreted the Clean Water Act as providing
that when a state has failed to submit TMDLs to EPA for an extended
period,69 the state is treated as having constructively submitted a de-
termination that no TMDLs are needed for any of its waters.70 Under
these circumstances, EPA is required to review this "determination"
and to promulgate federal TMDLs if the state has water quality-lim-
ited waters within its borders.71 For example, in Scott v. Hammond,
72
federal action under the authority of § 1313(d)(2)."). See also Longview Fibre Co. v. Ras-
mussen, 980 F.2d at 1310:
In the case at bar, all three states declined to adopt total maximum daily loads,
and asked that EPA do so as a federal action. The EPA action is in the form of a
disapproval of action by the states and imposition of standards by the EPA, under
33 U.S.C. § 1313, although the states requested the disapproval.
69. For example, until a citizen suit was brought against EPA in the mid-1980s, "the
State of Alaska had never submitted any TMDLs to the EPA, and.., the EPA had done
nothing to establish any TMDLs." Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner, 20 F.3d at 983.
One court has surmised that Congress anticipated that states might neglect their obligation
to submit TMDLs, but urged that such inaction should not be permitted to undermine the
Act's effectiveness:
The House Conference Report indicates that the TMDL proposal originated in
the House as part of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendment of
1972. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 92-1465, 122 (1972). The original House Report
on the 1972 legislation expresses the states' obligation to submit TMDL's as a
mandatory duty. See H.R.REP. No. 92-911, 106 (1972). ("The State shall estab-
lish . . . the total maximum daily load.") The problem of state nonfeasance in
submitting proposed TMDL's is not contemplated in the House Report. How-
ever, the Senate Report on the same legislation identified states' failures to fulfill
their responsibilities under the existing legislation as a major problem which the
Senate hoped to overcome by passing the 1972 amendments. See S.Rep. No. 92-
414, 1-10, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3669-3677. Thus, we are confi-
dent that Congress did not intend for state inaction to preclude adoption of
TMDL's.
Scott v. Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 998 n.13 (7th Cir. 1984).
70. See Hammond, 741 F.2d at 996 ("if a state fails over a long period of time to
submit proposed TMDL's, this prolonged failure may amount to the 'constructive submis-
sion' by that state of no TMDL's."). See id. at 997-98:
[W]e think the states' inaction here, in view of the short statutory deadlines, may
have ripened into a refusal to act. A refusal to act would amount to a determina-
tion that no TMDL is necessary and none should be provided. In effect, we may
have a 'constructive submission' of no TMDL's.")
See also Natural Resources Defense Council v. Fox, 909 F. Supp. at 160:
[T]he continued failure of a state to establish TMDLs creates a continuing duty of
the Administrator to disapprove of the state's actions and to promulgate TMDLs.
Because the state is directed to create TMDLs and submit them to the EPA from
time to time, the continued failure to do so is also a repeated failure to do so,
triggering separate duties of the Administrator to respond.
71. See Hammond, 741 F.2d at 998, where the court stated that:
As a matter of law, under CWA § 303(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2), a state deter-
mination to set no TMDL's must be reviewed by the EPA, and the EPA is then
required to approve or disapprove the submission. If EPA disapproves, it must
set its own TMDL's. Id. If the district court determines that the states have made
a "constructive submission" of no TMDL's, the failure of the EPA to act would
amount to failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty and is properly raised by
this complaint.
See also Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly, 796 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (W.D. Wash. 1992),
affd 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994) ("A state's inaction triggers the EPA's affirmative duty to
step into the state's role and begin the TMDLs process." (citation omitted); cf. Alaska Ctr.
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the court reviewed a claim that was based, in part, on the failure of
Indiana and Illinois73 to list portions of Lake Michigan as water qual-
ity impaired and their failure to identify TMDLs for that lake.74 The
court in that case held that a state's failure to submit the lists required
by section 303(d) triggered a nondiscretionary duty on the part of
EPA to establish TMDLs for the state.75
The third step in the TMDL process involves the determination
of the waste load allocation (WLA). WLAs dictate the maximum dis-
charge of pollutants that will be permitted from each point source dis-
charging into a water quality-limited waterway. 76 This allocation will
be accurate only if it accounts for the pollution contributed by
nonpoint sources. The WLA attributable to nonpoint source pollu-
tion cannot be allocated to any point source. In the case of the WLA
for the Columbia River, EPA accounted for the pollution attributable
to nonpoint sources and allocated the remaining load, which was less
than one half of the river's TMDL for dioxin, to the point sources
along the river, in that case paper mills. 77
In the final step of the TMDL process, the permit writer incorpo-
rates effluent limits into a given point source's NPDES permit, based
for the Env't v. Browner, 20 F.3d at 984 ("The EPA in this appeal does not challenge the
district court's holding ... that the EPA is in violation of the mandatory requirements of
the CWA.").
72. Hammond, 741 F.2d 992.
73. See id. at 996 n.10.
74. See id. at 997 ("The allegation of the complaint that no TMDL's are in place,
coupled with the EPA's admission that the states have not made their submissions, raises
the possibility that the states have determined that TMDL's for Lake Michigan are
unnecessary.").
75. See id. at 998 ("The EPA's inaction appears to be tantamount to approval of state
decisions that TMDL's are unneeded. State inaction amounting to a refusal to act should
not stand in the way of successfully achieving the goals of federal anti-pollution policy.
Thus, the dismissal of the TMDL claim was erroneous.").
76. NPDES TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 16, at 6-9 ("Before calculating a water
quality-based effluent limit [in this circumstance], the permit writer must establish the
WLA for the point source involved. A WLA is the fraction of a receiving water's TMDL
that is allocated to one of its existing or future point sources of pollution.").
77. See Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Rasmussen, 37 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1845 at
*1:
[T]he EPA analyzed the flow volumes at various points in the River to determine
the River's loading capacity, which represents the total maximum daily load of
dioxin that could be released into the river without causing the concentration ofdioxin to exceed 0.013 ppq. The EPA calculated that only 5.97 milligrams per day
could be released, and allocated approximately 35% of this total maximum daily
load to the American chlorine-bleaching pulp mills on the River.)
See also Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d at 1309 ("The 2.38 milligrams per day
figure was based on allowing the mills, including a Canadian mill not subject to EPA regu-
lation, to discharge 40% of the assumed capacity for dioxins of the Columbia River
Basin.").
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on the WLA for that point source.78 In the case of the Columbia
River, this meant revising the NPDES permits of several chlorine
bleaching pulp mills to include more stringent limitations on dioxin
discharges in the permits.79
At its conclusion, the TMDL process leads to the incorporation
of revised effluent limitations into the NPDES permit for a given
point source. The TMDL requirement is redundant since it is another
mechanism for accomplishing the same result already directly man-
dated by section 301. Section 301 calls for the establishment of more
stringent effluent limits in NPDES permits so that state WQSs will be
met in all waters of the United States. The TMDL requirement is
designed to do much the same thing.80
3. The 1987 Toxic Hot Spots Control Requirement
In 1987, Congress added section 304(l) to the Clean Water Act8 '
and "effectively required the states and EPA to place a high priority
on identifying and controlling certain 'toxic hot spots.' ,,8 2 That provi-
sion "did not change the basic requirements of the CWA; rather, it
simply established a mandatory schedule for the completion of a toxic
pollutant subset of the water quality-related activities that the CWA
already imposed. '8 3
The toxic hot spots requirement employed a regulatory approach
quite similar to the one just discussed for establishing TMDLs. First,
Congress required states to submit to EPA listings of waters in which
quality was impaired by toxic pollutants.8 4 EPA regulations require
78. Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d at 1520 ("When a TMDL and spe-
cific wasteload allocations for point sources have been established, any NPDES permits
issued to a point source must be consistent with the terms of the TMDL and WLA. See 40
C.F.R. § 130.2.").
79. Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d at 1309 ("The EPA generated a figure
of 2.38 milligrams per day of allowable dioxin discharge for all of the chlorine-bleaching
pulp mills, to be divided up among them in their permits.").
80. See supra Part I.C.2. The TMDL mechanism is somewhat different from the sec-
tion 301 program, however, because the TMDL process yields more stringent permit limits
only when a series of important actions have been taken and decisions made by state offi-
cials about the quality of receiving waters and the point and nonpoint sources whose efflu-
ent affects that quality.
81. Water Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 9 (1987).
82. Westvaco Corp. v. EPA, 899 F.2d 1383, 1385 (4th Cir. 1990).
83. Id. See also Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1319 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("The effect of the individual control strategy is simply to expedite the imposi-
tion of water quality-based limitations on polluters-limitations which otherwise would
have been imposed when the polluters' NPDES permits expired.").
84. See Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. 1314(l)(1); see generally 40 C.F.R. § 130.10(d). In
fact, states must submit three lists to EPA. See PERCIVAL, supra note 3, at 952-53. The list
required by subsection (A)(i) is to include waters that fail to attain or maintain WQSs "due
to toxic pollutants." 33 U.S.C. § 1314(l)(1)(A)(i). The list required by subsection (A)(ii) is
to identify waters that fail to attain several defined water quality goals, including "protec-
1997]
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states to refer to their TMDL lists of impaired waters when preparing
the lists required by section 304(l).85 The section 304(l) lists should, in
large part, identify those waters suffering from toxic pollutant degra-
dation among those identified in the TMDL lists. This is so because
the Clean Water Act mandates that the TMDL lists identify all of a
state's impaired waters, regardless of the pollutant causing the
impairment.
As with the TMDL regulatory scheme, the listing of waters does
not itself impose any new limitations on point source discharges.86
The regulatory force of section 304(l) is felt, and permit limitations are
imposed, when its other two requirements are implemented. 87 This is
where the "toxic hot spots" identified by the state are subjected to
individual control strategies (ICSs). Section 304(l)(1)(C) requires the
state to determine which point sources are discharging the toxic pollu-
tants believed to be impairing water quality in each waterway listed
pursuant to section 304(l)(1)(C). States must also identify the amount
of each toxic pollutant discharged by each source.88 Once these point
sources and their discharges are identified, section 304(l)(1)(D) pro-
vides that:
States must prepare and submit for Agency approval an [ICS] for each
listed water segment that will produce a reduction in the discharge of
toxic pollutants from the identified point sources sufficient to meet
water quality standards for the toxic pollutants as soon as possible but
no later than three years after the establishment of the ICS.89
tion of public health," protection of the aquatic ecosystem, and "allow[ing] recreational
activities in and on the water." 33 U.S.C. § 1314(1)(1)(A)(ii). The third list, required by
subsection (B), is to include waters that will fail to meet WQSs after applicable technology-
based controls have been imposed due to point source discharges of toxic pollutants. 33
U.S.C. § 1314()(1)(B). These lists vary in the scope of the waters to be included. The
(A)(ii) list is the most inclusive and the (B) list the most restrictive. PERCIVAL, supra note
3, at 953.
85. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.10(d)(6)(v). Congress established a two year limit for the sub-
mission of these section 304(l) lists. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(l)(1).
86. In re J&L Specialty Products Corp., 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 40,230, 40,232 (E.P.A.
E.A.B. June 20, 1994):
A listing decision under section 304(l) serves only as an indication that some type
of NPDES permitting action may be necessary to attain and maintain compliance
with water quality standards for toxic pollutants. Until that permit action is
taken, there is no obligation upon the discharger flowing from the listing decision
that could possibly be the subject of review.
87. These requirements are discussed generally in 40 C.F.R. § 123.46.
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1)(1)(C). The scope of this listing requirement has been contro-
versial. EPA's Appeals Board, for example, states that this listing of point sources and
their discharges is required only for B list waters, which are described supra note 84. In re
J&L Specialty Products Corp., 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 40,230. The Ninth Circuit
has held, however, that this listing of point sources and their discharges must be submitted
for impaired waters included on any of the three required lists. See PERCIVAL, supra note
3, at 953.
89. In re J&L, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. at 40,231 (citing 304(/)(1)(D); footnote omitted). A
source must be listed pursuant to section 304(1)(1)(C) before it is subject to the ICS re-
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EPA regulations provide that a point source's ICS is its NPDES per-
mit.90 This means that a source's NPDES permit is required to in-
clude the more stringent limitations on toxic pollutant discharges
necessary to ensure that the state's WQSs are met. Triggering the ICS
requirement, therefore, imposes a three year outer limit for complying
with the WQS for any relevant toxic pollutant.91 This statutory dead-
line trumps any more lenient compliance deadline that would other-
wise be available to point sources under the applicable state WQSs.92
quirement. See In re Florida Pulp & Paper Ass'n, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 40,380, 40,384 (E.P.A.
E.A.B. May 17, 1995):
Based on our review of the record on appeal, it is clear that the present permit is
not, nor could it be, an ICS because the facility does not meet the statutory pre-
requisites for imposing an ICS. That is, the Fenholloway River, into which Buck-
eye discharges its effluent, is not a listed water segment under CWA
§304(l)(1)(A) or (B), nor has the Foley Mill been identified as a point source
pursuant to CWA §304(l)(1)(C). Thus, the facility legally cannot be subject to the
requirements of section 304(l).
(citation omitted). But compare the following from Natural Resources Defense Council v.
EPA, 915 F.2d at 1323 n.1l:
EPA's regulations require ICS's not only for stream segments whose point source
toxic problem, if eliminated, would bring the segment up to standards, but also
for segments not meeting that description but whose point source contribution of
a particular toxic is so severe that, standing alone, it would cause an excursion
above the applicable water quality standard regardless of any nonpoint source
contribution of the toxic. 40 C.F.R. § 130.10(d)(5)(ii). The inclusion of this latter
type of stream segment in the ICS program has not been challenged. We note
that EPA has ample authority, in addition to CWA § 304(l), to require expedited
action on such stream segments.
90. 40 C.F.R. § 123.46(c). See Westvaco Corp. v. EPA, 899 F.2d 1383, 1386 ("Exercis-
ing its agency discretion, EPA has defined an ICS to be a draft or final NPDES permit,
with supporting documentation showing that effluent limits are sufficient to meet the appli-
cable water quality standards.").
91. See In re J&L, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. at 40,234 (§ 304(t) "allows applicable water qual-
ity standards to be achieved, via water quality-based effluent limitations imposed under
section 301(b)(1)(C), as soon as possible but not later than three years after the establish-
ment of the ICS." (footnote omitted)). See also Natural Resources Defense Council v.
EPA, 915 F.2d at 1319:
The effect of the [ICSs] is simply to expedite the imposition of water-quality-
based limitations on polluters-limitations which otherwise would have had to be
imposed when the polluters' NPDES permits expired. NPDES permits are issued
for periods of no more than five years, although administrative delays can extend
de facto the duration of the permits.
92. See In re J&L, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. at 40,233 ("section 304(l) listing decision may
affect the period of time allowed for a permittee to come into compliance with the applica-
ble effluent limitations and/or water quality standards for the toxic pollutants identified in
the listing decision."); see also id. at 40,234:
The Ohio regulation does not limit the [compliance] schedule term, and therefore
if it applies exclusively, the schedule presumably could be for a full permit term of
five years if the permit issuer determined that this period was appropriate. In
contrast, section 304(1) limits the time allowed for compliance to three years from
the establishment of the ICS. These sources of authority may operate concur-
rently, and if so, section 304(l) might serve to limit the amount of time for compli-
ance that may otherwise be available under the Ohio regulation, because the
State regulation cannot grant more time than that allowed under the federal
statute.
(footnote omitted).
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As with the TMDL provision, 93 Congress has delegated impor-
tant oversight responsibilities to EPA.94 States must submit and EPA
must review the lists of toxic hot spots and the list of point sources
impairing the waters.95 EPA was required to implement the provi-
sions of section 304(l) itself before June 4, 1990, if a state failed to
submit the required lists or if EPA failed to approve the state's sub-
missions. 96 In the event that EPA has disapproved a portion of a
state's submission, EPA must implement the section 304(l) require-
ments for that disapproved portion. 97
The 1987 enactment of section 304(l) demonstrated Congress'
conviction that toxic pollutants emitted by point sources should not be
allowed to degrade water quality to unhealthy levels. As imple-
mented by EPA, the regulatory approach mandated by the Act leads
to the inclusion of more stringent limitations in NPDES permits when
necessary to ensure WQS compliance. This regulatory approach is es-
sentially the same as that already dictated by sections 301(b)(1)(C)
and 303(d). The fact that Congress felt the need to enact a new and
duplicative provision in 1987 suggests strongly that it recognized that
the regulatory approaches already in place were not adequately pro-
tecting water quality.
4. More Stringent Effluent Limitations Under Section 302
The Clean Water Act also requires reductions in point source
emissions by delegating limited authority to EPA to impose more
stringent permit limitations directly, when necessary to prevent the
violation of WQSs.98 The section 301(b)(1)(C) requirement that
NPDES permits contain the more stringent limitations necessary to
ensure compliance with state WQSs applies to the permit-issuing
agency, usually a state agency, rather than EPA. The section 302 au-
93. See supra Part I.C.2.
94. EPA's role under § 304(l) is summarized at 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.10(d)(8-11)
95. 40 C.F.R. § 130.10(d)(8).
96. 40 C.F.R. § 130.10(d)(9). The submission of lists and EPA's actions with respect
to those submissions are not subject to direct review. See Westvaco Corp. v. EPA, 899
F.2d at 1386-87, holding that court lacks jurisdiction:
[Over] Westvaco's petitions for review challeng[ing] EPA's preliminary partial
disapprovals of the Maryland and Virginia lists which, it asserts, may affect its
Luke and Covington Mills. Specifically, the petitions seek judicial review of
EPA's proposed B and C lists for Maryland and Virginia, and of the associated
ICSs that may be promulgated for the Luke Mill and Covington Mill sources.
See also In re J&L, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. at 40,232:
[O]nly NPDES permit conditions, not listing decisions per se, are subject to re-
view by this Board but in the course of such review, the Board can consider a
petitioner's collateral attack upon the Agency's actions in implementing section
304(l) where the listing decision is material to the permit condition at issue.
97. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.10(d)(10).
98. 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1994).
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thority, by contrast, is granted to EPA alone, and allows the agency to
act even when a state administers its own NPDES program.
EPA's supplemental authority under section 30299 can, however,
only be exercised after a public hearing has been held'O° and is subject
to feasibility modifications that increase the amount of the permitted
discharges. 101 Scholars have suggested that these limitations have
foreclosed EPA's use of its section 302 authority. 10 2 Professor Rod-
gers, in fact, characterizes section 302 as a "virtual dead letter.' 10 3
5. State Certification of WQS Compliance and Imposition of
Necessary Conditions Under Section 401104
The fifth and final mechanism for ensuring compliance with state
WQSs applies in the few states in which EPA administers the NPDES
program. 105 Section 401 of the Clean Water Act provides that, before
a federal agency may issue a permit authorizing discharges into sur-
face waters, downstream states with waters that will be affected by the
permitted discharges must certify that the issuance of the federal per-
mit will not cause a violation of their WQSs.106 The Act provides,
moreover, that these affected states may require that the federal per-
mits include conditions necessary to ensure compliance with their
WQSs.107 When a state dictates that such conditions are needed, the
conditions may not be overruled by the federal permitting agency. 0 8
99. S. REP. No. 99-50, at 24 (1986):
Section 302 is not intended to undercut or in any way affect the development of
water quality standards under section 303 nor the imposition of section 301
(b)(1)(C) of the Act. Rather, it is a supplemental provision which directs the
Administrator, with the concurrence of the State, to impose effluent limitations
which assure the attainment or maintenance of water quality ....
See also THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & RONALD H. ROSENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND READINGS 1192 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter SCHOENBAUM &
ROSENBERG].
100. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(1).
101. Id. § 1312(b)(2).
102. See JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECION: CASES - LEGISLATION - POLICIES 346 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter BONINE];
SCHOENBAUM AND ROSENBERG, supra note 99, at 1191 (stating that section 302's "authori-
zation for water quality related effluent limitations contains several complicating features
which have apparently lead to its non-use.").
103. See generally RODGERS, supra note 3, at 26.
104. Section 401 and its related legislative history are discussed in more detail in Healy,
supra note 11, at 410-13.
105. Forty states are responsible for administering the NPDES permit program. See
LA NPDES Monitoring, supra note 47. Section 401 does not apply to state-issued permits
in these states.
106. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
107. Id. § 1341(d).
108. See Healy, supra note 11, at 411-12.
1997]
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The Supreme Court recently interpreted the state certification
authority described above quite broadly. 109 The effect of section 401
is accordingly to give affected states the power to veto NPDES per-
mits issued by the EPA or to place conditions on those permits if the
states determine that the discharges to be permitted would cause
WQS violations.110
The discussion in the preceding sections has demonstrated that
Congress has sought to ensure WQS compliance through the NPDES
permit system. Indeed, Congress has defined five methods for writing
point source NPDES permits to ensure that the permitted discharges
will not cause WQS violations. These five methods operate without
regard to the level of discharges that the applicable technology-based
standards would otherwise permit. Despite this complex scheme for
protecting water quality, the Clean Water Act's NPDES permit sys-
tem has failed to ensure WQS compliance. The following section de-
scribes the current state of the nation's waters and offers some
possible explanations for WQS noncompliance under the Act.
II
PERMIT LIMITATIONS-BASED ENFORCEMENT OF STATE
WQSs HAS FAILED
Although the Clean Water Act is designed to achieve compliance
with state WQSs through the incorporation of more stringent effluent
limitations into the NPDES permits for point sources, this regulatory
scheme has proved to be a failure. Despite a quarter century of regu-
lation under the Clean Water Act, recent national studies reveal a sig-
nificant level of noncompliance with WQSs. Approximately one
quarter to one third of the nation's waters are not in compliance with
WQSs, while particular aquatic sites may suffer much higher levels of
impairment.1 These national studies are consistent with more fo-
109. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 114 S. Ct.
1900 (1994).
110. See Healy, supra note 11, at 427-28.
111. See H.R. REP. No. 102-1095, at 213 (1992):
At the time of its enactment in 1972, the Clean Water Act set a goal of assuring
fishable and swimmable waters throughout the Nation by 1984 and eliminating
the discharge of pollutants by 1985. Today, approximately 30 percent of all as-
sessed river miles fail to attain fully designated water quality standards. Twenty-
five percent of lakes are impaired and 29 percent of estuaries similarly do not
meet designated water quality standards.
See also S. REP. No. 103-33, at 14 (1993) ("About 30 percent of the Nation's, rivers and
streams did not meet water quality standards. Twenty percent of lakes were impaired and
25 percent identified as threatened. Fully 92 percent of the shoreline miles of the Great
Lakes were not meeting water quality standards."); Water Pollution: Water Quality Indica-
tors Report Sets Baseline for Future Efforts, EPA Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 453 (June 14,
1996) [hereinafter Water Quality Indicators Report] (summarizing a report on the quality of
waters nationwide which found that "[m]ore than 60 percent of fresh water mussels and
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cused reports of the condition of waters within particular states. For
example, recent reports of conditions of waters in Virginia 1 2 and Min-
nesota, 113 as well as other states,114 indicate that WQSs are not being
met in those states. Although explanations for these degraded condi-
tions may vary,115 it is uncontroverted that current water quality is
very often below the quality mandated by the Clean Water Act.
This section will attempt to explain this failure of the Clean Water
Act to ensure WQS compliance. It will discuss the inadequate imple-
mentation of the Act's core requirement that NPDES permits include
sufficiently stringent effluent limitations and the likelihood of contin-
ued WQS violations, notwithstanding possible improvements in the
Act's implementation. The long history of failed implementation and
the likelihood of similarly flawed implementation in the future mean
that the nation's degraded water quality is unlikely to improve unless
the water pollution control regime is changed. Following this section,
crayfish are at risk, the highest imperilment ratio documented for any group of plants or
animals in the United States."). See generally RODGERS, supra note 3, at 264-70 (surveying
the limited effect of the Clean Water Act on improved water quality); id. at 348-50 (dis-
cussing how "[WQS] violations, like sin and sloth, are very much a part of the human
condition."); PERCIVAL, supra note 3, at 875-76.
112. D. Brennen Keene, Comment, The Inconsistency of Virginia's Execution of the
NPDES Permit Program: The Foreclosure of Citizen Attorneys General from State and Fed-
eral Court, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 715, 717 n.13 (1995) ("55% of Virginia's biological moni-
toring stations registered from 'impaired' to 'severely impaired' water. Also, Virginia bans
fishing or advises against consumption of fish from 458 miles of river within the state."
(citations omitted)).
113. Sierra Club v. Browner, 843 F. Supp. 1304, 1308 (D. Minn. 1993):
According to [the 1992 Minnesota Water Quality Report to Congress, Minnesota]
had assessed 4,634 miles of the total 91,944 total river miles and 1,753 of Minne-
sota's 11,842 significant lakes. The appendix to the 1992 Report lists approxi-
mately 1116 waters which do not meet one or more water quality standards.
See also Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. 1422, 1425 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (in
a 1988 report, Alaska "categorized several hundred distinct waterbodies as either 'im-
paired' or 'threatened' by water pollution." (citation omitted)).
114. See Water Pollution: Guidance Issued to Northwestern States on CWA Listing Pro-
cess for Impaired Waters, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1298 (Dec. 1, 1995) stating that Washington
state "now lists 445 water bodies as violating water quality standards," while Idaho lists 962
such water bodies within its borders); Polluted Oregon Waters Spur Lawsuit, 27 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1163 (Sept. 30, 1996) (stating that Oregon lists 870 water bodies that fail to comply
with water quality standards); Water Pollution: Federal Court Orders EPA to Set TMDLs
for Georgia Waters Not Meeting Standards, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1060 (Sept. 20, 1996)
(stating that "Georgia currently lists more than 500 segments" of impaired waters).
115. See S. REP. No. 103-33, at 14 (1993) ("The scientific community identified signifi-
cant impairments to the ecological integrity of waterbodies, mostly as a result of nonpoint
sources of pollution."); see also, Sierra Club v. Browner, 843 F. Supp. at 1308 (EPA be-
lieves "that at least some of the 1116 [degraded] waters [in Minnesota] are those not meet-
ing water quality standards because a point source is not meeting its permit
requirements."); PERCIVAL, supra note 3, at 950 ("Nonpoint sources are significant sources
of toxic pollutants. A study of the Hudson River found that nonpoint sources added more
than 6,000 times the PCB's, 700 times the lead, cadmium, and mercury, and 23 times the oil
and grease than did point sources." (citation omitted)).
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the Article will consider whether permitting citizen suit enforcement
of WQSs would be an appropriate change.
A. EPA's Implementation of the Clean Water Act Has Failed to
Ensure That WQSs Are Met
As discussed above, the theory behind the Clean Water Act's
structure is that state WQSs will be achieved by requiring point source
NPDES permits to include more stringent effluent limitations when
necessary. These more stringent limits are the straightforward man-
date of section 301,116 and are also the end result of the TMDL, Toxic
Hot Spots ICS, section 302, and section 401 regulatory schemes dis-
cussed above. 117 EPA's implementation of the more stringent limita-
tions requirement has, however, been inadequate in a number of
important respects. As noted above, surveys of water quality illus-
trate that the system has failed to achieve timely, or even delayed,
WQS compliance. The sections that follow describe the administra-
tive and implementation problems that have plagued the Clean Water
Act's water quality program. These problems have been largely re-
sponsible for the failure of the more stringent limitations requirement.
1. EPA's Long Delay in Promulgating Implementing Regulations
EPA is responsible for defining the minimum requirements for all
NPDES programs through the issuance of regulations.11 8 Seventeen
years passed following the enactment of the Clean Water Act, how-
ever, before EPA included "the procedures for developing water qual-
ity-based effluent limits" in those minimum requirements.1 9 These
procedures describe how permit writers should translate numeric and
narrative WQSs into effluent limitations for particular point sources.
When EPA finally promulgated the long delayed regulations, it com-
mented that the permit-issuing agencies already had the authority to
116. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
117. See supra Part I.C.
118. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). NPDES permits may be issued either by states that have
received permit granting authority from EPA or by EPA. Forty states have been granted
the authority to issue NPDES permits. LA NPDES Monitoring, supra note 47. EPA re-
views and has authority to veto state-issued NPDES permits. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d).
119. EPA promulgated the regulations in June of 1989. National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System; Surface Water Toxics Control Program, 54 Fed. Reg. 23,868, 23,871
(1989) ("Although sections 402(a)(1) and 301(b)(1)(C) of the CWA provide the authority
to require NPDES permits to achieve the effluent limits necessary to attain and maintain
water quality standards, the existing NPDES regulations do not describe the procedures
for developing water quality-based effluent limits."). Eight years had elapsed before EPA
initially promulgated its regulations for the issuance of NPDES permits. See Michael D.
Axline & Patrick C. McGinley, Universal Statutes and Planetary Programs: How EPA Has
Diluted the Clean Water Act, 8 J. ENVrL. L. & LITIG. 253, 275 (1993) ("In 1980, eight years
after Congress instructed EPA to develop the NPDES permit program, EPA adopted final
regulations implementing the program." (footnote omitted)).
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impose more stringent limitations, even in the absence of those regu-
lations.120 The EPA's delay nonetheless proved to be a very serious
impediment for permit-issuing agencies, both because binding mini-
mum requirements were lacking until EPA finally promulgated its reg-
ulations, and because the absence of regulations suggested a lack of
concern at the agency about ensuring compliance with the more strin-
gent limitations requirement.
2. EPA Does Not Require That NPDES Permits Define Effluent
Limits for All Pollutants Discharged by a Point Source
Because the Clean Water Act includes a broad prohibition on the
discharge of pollutants into waters of the United States without a per-
mit,121 one might expect that a permitted source would be barred from
discharging any pollutant not covered by its permit. EPA has not,
however, interpreted the Act as giving the permit requirement this
"universal" effect. 122 Rather, EPA has only required that NPDES
permits include effluent limits for the pollutants identified in the per-
mit. The discharge of other pollutants in significant amounts must
merely be reported to the permit-issuing agency, and pollutants not
discharged in significant amounts are not regulated at all.123 EPA's
120. EPA made the following comment in the preamble:
Although EPA's existing NPDES regulations provide adequate authority to re-
quire water quality-based effluent limits in permits when an excursion above a
water quality criterion is either identified or projected, the existing regulations do
not describe the procedures for developing such limits. Today's regulations estab-
lish minimum consistent procedures for the states, EPA, and the regulated com-
munity, to use in developing water quality-based effluent limitations.
See National Pollution Discharge Elimination System; Surface Water Toxics Control Pro-
gram, 54 Fed. Reg. at 23,871.
121. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342.
122. Axline & McGinley, supra note 119, at 267 stating that:
The history of EPA's current NPDES permit program reveals that EPA has vacil-
lated on the question of how comprehensive permits should be, and has moved
incrementally away from the universal program required by the CWA and to-
wards a planetary program that can never achieve the lofty goals of the CWA.
But compare PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 453 n.3 (1994), which states that the question whether a permit bars the discharge
of pollutants not identified in the permit is an "important issue that has received little
judicial attention."
123. See Axline & McGinley, supra note 119, at 278, where the authors state that:
EPA's strategy for addressing unregulated but "significant" pollutants, however,
has not evolved beyond the self-reporting system adopted in 1980 and is imple-
mented (if at all) only by admittedly overworked permit writers. EPA has no
process for addressing pollutants that, for whatever reason, fail to rise to the level
of "significance."
Thus, in EPA's final 1980 rulemaking, the Agency admitted that some toxic pollu-
tants need not even be reported in permit applications, that other "non-signifi-
cant" pollutants, while reported in applications, are "not limited in permits" nor
"specifically controlled in the permit," and that additions of even significant pol-
lutants to the wastestream of permit holders "are regulated only by the require-
ment that permittees notify the Director" when a threshold level is reached.
(footnote omitted)
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interpretation of the scope of the NPDES permitting requirement
thus allows point sources with NPDES permits to discharge some pol-
lutants without any effective, enforceable limit.' 2 4
The impact of EPA's NPDES permitting policy can be gauged by
considering the court's decision in Atlantic States Legal Foundation v.
Eastman Kodak.125 In that case, the Eastman Kodak Company (Ko-
dak) was a permitted point source. 126 Kodak's permit included efflu-
ent limits for at least twenty-five pollutants.127 Atlantic States Legal
Foundation brought a citizen suit arguing that Kodak was discharging
pollutants that had no limits defined by the company's NPDES permit
and that this violated the Clean Water Act. 2 8 The court rejected this
claim and held that, when a permit fails to define an effluent limit for
a pollutant, the permittee complies with the requirements of the Clean
Water Act when it meets any applicable reporting requirements for
the discharge of pollutants not covered by an NPDES permit.'
2 9
The EPA regulatory policy described above is important because
it tends to contribute to the degradation of water quality.' 30 This deg-
124. See id. at 279, where the authors discuss that EPA has recognized this regulatory
gap.
125. 12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1993).
126. See id. at 354.
127. See id. at 355:
DEC issued Kodak a SPDES permit, number 000-1643, effective November 1,
1984, establishing specific effluent limitations for approximately 25 pollutants.
The permit also included 'action levels' for five other pollutants as well as for
three of the pollutants for which it had established effluent limits. DEC further
required Kodak to conduct a semi-annual scan of "EPA Volatile, Acid and Base/
Neutral Fractions and PCB's priority pollutants on a 24-hr. composite sample."
(footnotes omitted)
128. See id. at 357 ("Atlantic States argues first that the plain language of section 301
of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311, prohibits the discharge of any pollutants not expressly
permitted.").
129. See id. at 357 stating that:
Viewing the regulatory scheme as a whole, however, it is clear that the permit is
intended to identify and limit the most harmful pollutants while leaving the con-
trol of the vast number of other pollutants to disclosure requirements. Once
within the NPDES or SPDES scheme, therefore, polluters may discharge pollu-
tants not specifically listed in their permits so long as they comply with the appro-
priate reporting requirements and abide by any new limitations when imposed on
such pollutants.
(footnote omitted)
130. See Axline & McGinley, supra note 119, at 255-56 ("comparisons of additional...
disclosure statements and NPDES permits has revealed that the discharge of toxic chemi-
cals not mentioned in a NPDES permit is commonplace among a variety of industries.").
Indeed, the Kodak court specifically discussed EPA's recognition of this regulatory gap
when rejecting what the court characterized as "Atlantic States' absolutist and wholly im-
practical view of the legal effect of a permit." The court made the following comments in
rejecting the contention that Kodak's discharges had violated the CWA:
The EPA has never acted in any way to suggest that Atlantic States' absolutist
and wholly impractical view of the legal effect of a permit is valid. In fact, the
EPA's actions and policy statements have frequently contemplated discharges of
pollutants not listed under a NPDES or SPDES permit. It has addressed such
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radation may, in turn, result in the violation of WQSs, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the Clean Water Act is theoretically structured to
ensure compliance with those standards. Because it tends to degrade
water quality and conflict with the Act's purpose of limiting the intro-
duction of pollutants into surface waters, EPA's policy of excluding
some pollutants from NPDES permit coverage has been criticized
strongly.' 3 ' The policy also conflicts with the Act's structure because
the policy will protect water quality only after it has already been de-
graded and will not prevent degradation in the first place.
3. EPA's Interpretation of the More Stringent Limitations
Requirement Often Results in Requiring Only Monitoring
as a Permit Condition, Rather Than Actual
Effluent Limitations
Under EPA's interpretation of section 301, a permitting agency
must have evidence that more stringent limitations are actually neces-
sary to prevent a WQS violation before it may impose an effluent limi-
tation that is more stringent than the otherwise applicable technology-
based limitation. The agency must have evidence that the absence of
a more stringent limitation will or might reasonably be expected to
cause or contribute to a WQS violation. 132 The issue of whether a
discharges by amending the permit to list and limit a pollutant when necessary to
safeguard the environment without considering pre-amendment discharges to be
violations calling for enforcement under the CWA. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1365. The
EPA thus stated in its comments on proposed 40 C.F.R. § 122.68(a), which ap-
plied the "application-based" limits approach to implementation of the CWA re-
porting scheme,
There is still some possibility ... that a [NPDES or SPDES] permittee may
discharge a large amount of a pollutant not limited in its permit, and EPA
will not be able to take enforcement action against the permittee as long as
the permittee complies with the notification requirements [pursuant to the
CWA].
Kodak, 12 F.3d at 358 (footnote omitted, quoting 45 Fed. Reg. 33516, 33523 (1980)).
131. See Axline & McGinley, supra note 119, at 254 (EPA's "implementation of the
NPDES program has turned the CWA on its head by regulating only those pollutants spe-
cifically authorized by a NPDES permit and ignoring pollutants that are discharged to
waters of the United States but not addressed in a permit." (emphasis added)); see e.g., id.
at 262 ("Congress plainly anticipated that its permit program would sweep in all pollutants.
It did not say permits are required for the discharge of 'significant pollutants' or 'toxic
pollutants.' It said permits are required for the discharge of 'any pollutant."' (footnote
omitted)); cf id. at 263 ("The Act therefore requires EPA to meet the conditions of the
Act by regulating on a permit-by-permit basis those pollutants not covered by a national
effluent limitation standard.").
132. See In re Miami-Dade Water & Sewer Auth. Dep't, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) at 40,036, where the EPA's EAB stated that:
Under section 301(b)(1)(C), the Region is only required to include a permit limi-
tation if that limitation is "necessary" to ensure compliance with the State re-
quirements. Similarly, section 122.44(d), which requires the establishment of
permit limitations to ensure compliance with water quality standards and other
State requirements, also only applies if the permit limitation is "necessary" to
ensure compliance with the State requirement. In the context of water quality
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more stringent limitation is necessary under this standard is a factual
question that the permitting agency must resolve as part of the permit-
ting process. 133 The agency granting the permit must develop a factual
record to support its finding that a more stringent limitation is
necessary. 134
As with the EPA policy governing the discharge of pollutants not
covered by a point source's NPDES permit, the EPA policy governing
the more stringent limitations requirement of section 301(b)(1)(C) fo-
cuses on improving already degraded water quality rather than
preventing degradation initially. 135 Although EPA has suggested that
its policy provides for the control of pollutants before they have
caused water quality degradation, 136 the agency has counseled permit
standards, a permit limitation is deemed "necessary" to ensure compliance with a
water quality standard if the subject discharge "will cause, ha[s] the reasonable
potential to cause, or contribute to an excursion above any State water quality
standard * * *." 40 CFR § 122.44(d)(1)(I)
(footnote omitted). See also In re Boise Cascade Corp., Permittee, 24 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 40,116, 40,118 (EPA EAB Jan. 15, 1993) ("[Dissolved oxygen] limits may
not be included in the permit unless such limits are 'necessary' to ensure compliance with
Louisiana's water quality standard, i.e., unless discharges from the mill have a reasonable
potential for causing or contributing to a violation of that standard." (citations omitted)).
133. See In re Boise, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. at 40,119, where the EAB reviewed more strin-
gent permit requirements and stated that:
Presumably, the Region has determined that Boise's discharges do present such a
potential [to cause a WQS violation], but the factual basis for the Region's deter-
mination is not apparent in the administrative record before us. The Fact Sheet
merely states that "[t]he proposed permit contains requirements as necessary to
comply with the dissolved oxygen (D.O.) standard of 5.0 mg/l for this receiving
water." The response to comments similarly states that the permit requirement
"is required in accordance with the current State water quality standards and the
water quality management plan, pursuant to 40 CFR 122.44(d)." Neither docu-
ment provides enough factual information to allow us to conclude as a matter of
law that the mill's discharges present a reasonable potential for violating Louisi-
ana's standards. We conclude, therefore, that whether Boise's discharges will
cause or contribute to, or have a reasonable potential for causing or contributing
to, a violation of Louisiana's water quality standard is a material issue of fact.
(citations omitted).
See also id. at 40,120:
On appeal, Boise states that it does not dispute that EPA has authority to impose
reasonable biomonitoring requirements and that EPA could impose the bi-
omonitoring at issue if those requirements were in fact necessary to achieve Loui-
siana's narrative criterion for toxic substances. Boise states that the real issue is
whether the biomonitoring requirements in the permit 'are reasonable or neces-
sary to achieve Louisiana's narrative criterion for toxic substances.'
(citation omitted)
134. Id. at 40,119-20.
135. EPA policy defines the minimum requirements for the federal and state-adminis-
tered NPDES programs. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). States may, however, impose more
stringent requirements in their programs. Id. at § 1370; see 40 C.F.R. § 123.25(a).
136. See NPDES TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 16, at 6-5:
[N]umeric criteria that protect aquatic life from acute and chronic effects.., are
used as the basis to analyze an effluent and decide which chemicals need controls
and to derive permit limits to control those chemicals. This approach allows for
the control of individual chemicals before a water quality impact has occurred.
But compare id. at 6-7 stating that:
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writers that they should impose more stringent effluent limitations
only when they have strong factual support for those limitations. 137
To develop a sufficient factual record, EPA suggests that agencies im-
pose water quality monitoring requirements as conditions in NPDES
permits. 138 In light of EPA's view that a significant factual record is
necessary to support more stringent effluent limitations, 39 permit
writers are unlikely to be confident enough to predict that future dis-
charges will cause or contribute to WQS violations. Permit writers are
likely to impose a monitoring requirement that will detect degradation
rather than effluent limitations that would prevent it. This policy has
the effect of tolerating the degradation of water quality.
4. Permit Writers May Decline To Include More Stringent Effluent
Limitations, Due to the Difficulty of Defining Those Limits
Translating state WQSs and narrative standards into necessary ef-
fluent limits for individual point sources is quite difficult for several
reasons. A permit writer must predict whether the pollutant dis-
charges allowed by the applicable technology-based standard will
cause WQS violations. That projection is dependent on conditions in
When conducting an effluent characterization, the permit writer is essentially pro-
jecting the concentration of the pollutant(s) contained in the effluent once the
effluent reaches the receiving water. The permit writer then compares this pro-
jected receiving water concentration to the applicable State water quality criteria.
If the projected concentration exceeds the applicable water quality criteria, the
permit writer has established that [water-quality-based emissions limitations] are
needed.
137. See id. at 6-7:
If the permit authority so chooses, or if the circumstances dictate, the authority
may decide to develop and impose a permit limit for [whole effluent toxicity] or
individual toxicants without facility-specific effluent monitoring data.... In justi-
fication of a limit, EPA recommends that the more information the authority can
acquire to support the limit, the better a position the authority will be in to de-
fend the limit if necessary. In such a case, the regulatory authority may well bene-
fit from the collection of effluent monitoring data prior to establishing the limit.
138. See id. at 6-8, where EPA's guidance to permit writers states that:
If the regulatory authority, after evaluating all available information on the efflu-
ent, in the absence of effluent monitoring data, is not able to decide whether the
discharge causes, has the reasonable potential to cause, or contributes to an ex-
cursion above a numeric or narrative criterion for WET or for individual toxi-
cants, the authority should require WET or chemical-specific testing to gather
further evidence. In such a case, the regulatory authority can require the moni-
toring prior to permit issuance, if sufficient time exists, or it may require the test-
ing as a condition of the issued (reissued) permit.
Under such circumstances, the permit authority may include a permit reopener
allowing for the imposition of an effluent limit if the effluent testing establishes
that the discharge causes, has the reasonable potential to cause, or contributes to
an excursion above a water quality criterion.
139. See id. at 6-9 (stating that determining a waste load allocation of a point source is
based on an "exposure assessment," which in turn is based on either of two water quality
models-"steady-state and dynamic" and that "[t]he minimum data required for model
input include receiving water flow, effluent flow, effluent concentrations, and background
concentrations.").
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the receiving water, such as flow volume and pollutant levels. Pollu-
tant levels will depend on the discharges from other point and
nonpoint sources of pollution. Flow volume is dependent on precipi-
tation levels in the area and the amount of runoff entering surface
waters and tributaries. Pollution level and flow volume determina-
tions are complex and add to the difficulty associated with translating
narrative WQSs into effluent limitations.140 As a result of these diffi-
culties, permit writers have historically failed to include water quality-
based effluent limitations in NPDES permits. 141
This failure of permit writers to impose more stringent water
quality-based effluent limits in permits was no doubt encouraged by
the fact that EPA regulations failed to require the imposition of such
limitations until 1989.142 Even now, under its regulations requiring
the translation of WQSs into effluent limitations, EPA has employed a
"degrade first, protect later" policy by encouraging permitting agen-
cies to impose monitoring requirements prior to actually requiring re-
duced discharges to protect water quality. 143
Some of these problems may be remedied over time as permit
writers gain experience with implementing the 1984 regulations. Such
experience may give permit writers more confidence to mandate ac-
tual effluent limitations to ensure compliance with WQSs. Moreover,
as states increasingly employ numerical, rather than narrative, water
quality criteria, permit writers should have less difficulty defining ac-
140. The difficulty of identifying defensible effluent limits is also discussed supra at
notes 133-137 and accompanying text. See also NPDES TRAINING MANUAL, supra note
16, at 6-7:
The regulatory authority may already have effluent toxicity data available from
previous monitoring or it may decide to require the permittee to generate effluent
monitoring data prior to permit issuance or as a condition of the issued permit.
EPA recommends monitoring data be generated on effluent toxicity prior to per-
mit limit development for the following reasons: (1) the presence or absence of
effluent toxicity can be more clearly established or refuted, and (2) where toxicity
is shown, effluent variability can be more clearly defined.
See also id. at 6-8 to 6-9 (stating that "[t]he difficulty of setting WQBELs is further compli-
cated where water quality in a water body is affected by more than one discharger and the
burden of effluent reduction must be allocated among the various dischargers.").
141. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1317 (9th Cir.
1990):
Although ostensibly [permit writers] were supposed to impose these more strin-
gent limitations, in practice they often did not. One explanation for this failure is
that the criteria listed by the states, particularly for toxic pollutants, were often
vague narrative or descriptive criteria as opposed to specific numerical criteria.
These descriptive criteria were difficult to translate into enforceable limits on dis-
charges from individual polluters.
See also id. ("the complexity of [permitting] decisions and judgments led many a permit
writer to avoid making them altogether.") (citation omitted).
142. See supra Part II.A.1.
143. The use of monitoring requirements is discussed supra in Part II.A.3.
[Vol. 24:393
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tual pollution discharge limits. 1" Nevertheless, permit writers may
decide not to include more stringent effluent limitations in NPDES
permits when they believe that defining defensible limits is too diffi-
cult. The likely result of this would be continued failure to meet
WQSs.
5. EPA's Failed TMDL Implementation Policy
As discussed above, the structure of the Clean Water Act dictates
that NPDES permits should include more stringent effluent limita-
tions to prevent WQS violations. EPA policy has significantly under-
mined this structure by encouraging permit writers to impose such
limitations only after water quality has already suffered degrada-
tion.145 The same sorts of administrative and policy problems have
plagued the implementation of the Clean Water Act's TMDL
provision.
As discussed above, the TMDL requirement was designed to re-
inforce the more stringent limitations requirement of section 301 by
providing a mandatory mechanism for the identification of necessary
effluent limitations. 146 The TMDL requirement has been almost a to-
tal failure. Indeed, one court has remarked that "[t]he only 'consist-
ently held interpretation' that the EPA has demonstrated with respect
to the Clean Water Act's TMDL requirements has been to ignore
them."147
The TMDL regulatory process has failed in several important re-
spects.148 Some states have completely failed to submit the required
list of quality-impaired waters. Even when states have listed their im-
paired waters, they have often failed to identify TMDLs for all such
waters. Recall, for example, that in Scott v. Hammond, 49 the plain-
tiffs' claim and the court's holding were based on the failure of Indi-
ana and Illinois 150 to list portions of Lake Michigan as water quality
impaired and to identify TMDLs for the lake.151
144. See Natural Resources Defense Council, 915 F.2d at 1318 ("The requirement of
numerical criteria for toxics makes it easier for permit writers to incorporate the water
quality standards into NPDES permits. Permit writers thus no longer have an excuse for
failing to impose water-quality-based limitations on permit holders.").
145. See infra Part I.B.1.
146. See supra Part I.C.2. for a discussion of TMDLs.
147. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly, 796 F. Supp. at 1379.
148. Because of these failures and the 21 or so lawsuits that these administrative fail-
ures have prompted, EPA has recently sought to define a new policy for fully implementing
the TMDL program. See Water Pollution: Draft Plan for Improving TMDL Program Is-
sued at Meeting of New Advisory Panel, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1560 (Nov. 22, 1996) [herein-
after TMDL Draft Plan].
149. 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984).
150. See id. at 996 n.10.
151. See id. at 997 stating that:
1997]
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In Sierra Club v. Browner,152 the plaintiff sought to compel the
EPA to prepare TMDLs for Minnesota's impaired waters. Minnesota
had identified and listed 447 impaired waters pursuant to section
303(d), but had established only 43 acceptable TMDLs.153 Similarly,
in Alaska Center for the Environment v. Reilly,154 the court chided
EPA for "allow[ing] over a decade to pass before taking even these
first steps towards implementing the Alaskan TMDLs program."' 155
The court concluded that "[t]his delay has rendered TMDLs com-
pletely useless to date as a tool to control water pollution in Alaska"
and that "It]he failure of the EPA to perform its mandatory duties has
frustrated congressional intent underlying the TMDL provisions of
The allegation of the complaint that no TMDL's are in place, coupled with the
EPA's admission that the states have not made their submissions, raises the possi-
bility that the states have determined that TMDL's for Lake Michigan are
unnecessary.
152. 843 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Minn. 1993).
153. See id. at 1308 finding that:
In a December 1, 1993 letter to the court, counsel for the EPA submitted its pro-
posed section 303(d) list which will be published in the Federal Register. The list
identifies 447 WQLSs and prioritizes them for development of TMDLs. The EPA
states that it has approved 43 TMDLs submitted by the MPCA, but plaintiffs
assert that they were not valid TMDLs. The EPA notes that the MPCA has been
working on a complex TMDL for the Minnesota River for a 330 mile stretch of
the river.
The Reilly court stated that:
The EPA has disapproved Minnesota's most recent WQLS list and has developed
its own which will be published in the Federal Register shortly. Minnesota has
identified TMDLs that it believes should receive the highest priority, it has initi-
ated work on developing those TMDLs, and has implemented some TMDLs.
Although Minnesota and the EPA may not be implementing TMDLs as quickly
as plaintiffs would like, the Act does not set deadlines for the development of a
certain number of TMDLs. The Act instead requires the development of TMDLs
"in accordance with the priority ranking" of the WQLS list. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(d)(1)(C). A finding of a constructive submission of no TMDLs would
therefore be inappropriate on this record.
Id. at 1314. The court therefore declined to hold that EPA had a nondiscretionary duty to
establish TMDLs for all impaired waters in the state. See Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v.
Rasmussen, 37 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1845, at *8 ("the statutory requirement [is] that
each state prioritized waters requiring TMDLs based on the 'severity of the pollution."'
(citation omitted)). In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Fox, 909 F. Supp. D153, the
court considered a similar effort to impose upon EPA a nondiscretionary duty to identify
TMDLs for New York State. The court denied NRDC's motion for summary judgment,
concluding that "defendants have provided evidence, which the Court must take as true in
considering plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, that in fact New York has created and
submitted TMDLs to the EPA, and the EPA has approved them." Id. at 158 (citations
omitted). The court did indicate, however, that implementation of the TMDL requirement
had been deficient. See id. ("Although the Court, like plaintiffs, is left wondering 'where
are the TMDLs?', the Court must deny plaintiffs' summary judgment motion on the
grounds that the evidence submitted by the EPA has created a triable issue of fact of
whether New York has created and submitted TMDLs.").
154. 796 F. Supp. 1374 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
155. Id. at 1377.
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the CWA. ' ' 156 The court indicated that it believed that EPA's failure
reflected the agency's broader regulatory priorities. 157
Viewed together, Scott v. Hammond, Sierra Club v. Browner, and
Alaska Center for the Environment v. Reilly provide examples of the
TMDL implementation problems, including state failure to identify
water quality-limited segments and failure to establish TMDLs for
those waterways. The cases illustrate why the TMDL provision has
failed to ensure that WQSs are met. EPA statistics indicate, more-
over, that the problem of states failing to identify impaired waters and
establish TMDLs extends well beyond Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota,
and Alaska. 158 When these shortfalls within the TMDL program are
viewed together with other problems associated with the implementa-
tion of the more stringent effluent standards discussed above, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that EPA and the states have implemented the
Act's requirements and the NPDES permitting regime in a manner
that makes compliance with WQSs very difficult.
156. Id. The court's remedy for this regulatory neglect was rather limited. Although
the Clean Water Act had mandated the initial identification of TMDLs for all impaired
waters by the middle of 1974 (see supra note 57 and accompanying text), the court directed
the EPA "to work with the State of Alaska to establish a reasonable schedule for the
development of TMDLs for all waterbodies designated as water quality limited segments."
Id. at 1380. That schedule "may provide more specific deadlines for the establishment of a
few TMDLs," but was also permitted to include "only general planning goals for long-term
development of TMDLs for water quality limited segments about which little is known."
Id. (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 1378-79 finding that:
Robert Burd, Director of the EPA Region X's Water Division, justifies in detail
why the EPA has not made the implementation of a TMDLs program a priority,
despite the statutory requirement to do so. Mr. Burd points to the EPA's other
worthwhile water quality programs, and explains that the EPA "must retain the
ability, notwithstanding statutory deadlines, to respond to future environmental
crises by shifting available resources away from other tasks."
(citations and footnote omitted).
158. See Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. at 1425 ("In comparison to
Alaska's lack of progress in developing TMDLs, other areas of the country have a mixed
record of success. In 1989, EPA Region IV approved 163 TMDLs, Region V approved 74,
Region I approved 50, Region VIII approved 16, Region X approved 11. Regions II, III,
and VII, however, approved no TMDLs." (footnote and citation omitted)). Recent district
court decisions suggest however that there may be a limit to the willingness of courts to
accept long delays and unspecified deadlines for defining TMDLs. The fact remains that
TMDL delays continue to contribute to WQS compliance problems. See Water Pollution:
Federal Judge Tells EPA that Schedule for Idaho's TMDL Program is Too Long, 27 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1329 (Oct. 11, 1996) [hereinafter Idaho TMDL Program] (reporting that a
district court in Idaho rejected the EPA-approved 25-year schedule for setting TMDLs for
impaired waters and ordered that a "reasonable" schedule, possibly a five year schedule,
be substituted); see Georgia TMDLs, supra note 114 (reporting that a district court in
Georgia ordered that EPA establish TMDL's for the state's impaired waters within five
years); but cf. Impaired Water Listing Process, supra note 114 (reporting that EPA's gui-
dance for the Pacific northwest provides for priorities in setting TMDLs and that "[w]aters
identified as medium or low priority for TMDLs may not have additional controls recom-
mended in the near future .... ").
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B. Even Improved Implementation of the Clean Water Act by EPA
Would Not Ensure WQS Compliance
The sections that follow illustrate why WQS violations would still
occur, even if the Act were implemented in a more perfect manner.
Even if one assumes that EPA would improve its implementation of
the Clean Water Act over the next twenty-five years with respect to
the issuance of NPDES permits containing limitations calculated to
ensure WQS compliance, concerns about degraded water quality
should nevertheless remain. The affected public is therefore likely to
continue to have a strong interest in seeking an alternative mechanism
to control those violations.
1. Permit Writers Are Likely To Make Mistakes
Permit writers are likely to make mistakes in their jobs because of
the difficulty associated with translating WQSs, and particularly narra-
tive standards, into effluent limitations.159 As we have seen, EPA reg-
ulations now include standards that apply to defining more stringent
effluent limitations based on the applicable WQSs.160 In its training
manual, EPA warns permit writers that this translation process is
more difficult than determining the technology-based limitations for a
point source. 161 The difficulty associated with translating WQSs into
NPDES limitations was also made strikingly clear in Northwest Envi-
ronmental Advocate where the court stated that circumstances may
make it "impossible to determine the level at which to set a numeric
concentration-based permit limit in order to ensure that the gross
amount of pollution discharged will not violate water quality stan-
dards."'1 62 Indeed, honest mistakes in the definition of effluent stan-
dards appear to be inescapable, given that the WQSs to be translated
into effluent limits are often quite complex. For example, when defin-
ing specific effluent limits, permit writers must consider and select
among a range of variables. 163 They may have to rely upon sophisti-
159. See supra Part II.B.1.
160. See supra Part II.A.1.
161. See NPDES TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 16, at 3-4 ("Water quality-based lim-
its are generally more difficult to develop than effluent guidelines because they involve a
site-specific evaluation of the discharge and its effect on a receiving stream.").
162. Northwest Envtl. Advocate v. Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 1995), stating
that:
Because the number and volume of overflow events from CSO systems are
caused primarily by uncontrollable events-i.e., the amount of stormwater enter-
ing the system-regulators have no ready way of determining what portion of the
flow in a given discharge event is sewage and what portion is rainwater. Without
this information, it is impossible to determine the level at which to set a numeric
concentration-based permit limit in order to ensure that the gross amount of pol-
lution discharged will not violate water quality standards.
163. See NPDES TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 16, at 6-1 ("States may, at their dis-
cretion, adopt policies affecting the application and implementation of the standard, such
[Vol. 24:393
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cated surveys, 164  and default values when such studies are
incomplete. 165
Similar problems arise in defining TMDLs. Even when states list
their water quality impaired waterways and establish TMDLs, the
program may fail if the TMDLs themselves are flawed. Flaws in
TMDLs may arise because the available supporting evidence of toxic-
ity is "inconclusive and diverse,"'166 or because allocating specific pol-
lutant loads to nonpoint sources is uncertain. 167 In sum, even when
permit writers make a conscientious effort to define more stringent
effluent limitations to be included in NPDES permits, those limita-
tions are likely to be flawed and result in violations of state WQSs.
2. Revised WQSs Complicate the Establishment of and Compliance
with Effluent Limitations
The Clean Water Act requires triennial review and approval of
state WQSs. 168 This review process may produce revised WQSs that
are more protective for a variety of reasons. A state may, for exam-
ple, decide that it wishes to provide citizens with cleaner water for
their use and enjoyment.169 A state may also decide to substitute nu-
as mixing zones, variances, low flow exemptions, or schedules of compliance for water
quality-based permit limits. However, EPA retains authority to review and approve or
disapprove of such policies."); cf. American Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 346, 350
(D.C. Cir. 1993) ("when standards containing narrative criteria were enforced-often
through the device of whole effluent discharge limitations based on biological monitoring
techniques-the lack of standardized procedures made it impossible to even approximate
consistency in the translation of criteria into permit limitations." (footnote and citations
omitted)).
164. See NPDES TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 16, at 6-6 stating that:
The biocriteria approach [to defining effluent limits based on narrative standards
for toxics] first involves the use of numeric or narrative values to describe the
biological integrity of aquatic communities in a reference waterbody, and then
biosurveys are used to collect information on the overall health of aquatic com-
munities in a waterbody of interest. The results of the biosurveys are compared
to the reference waterbody to determine if the criteria are met.
165. See id. at 6-6 (EPA recommends, when data are insufficient, a default value for
defining an acute-to-chronic ration (ACR) for toxics).
166. See Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d at 1523 ("EPA was required by
§ 1313(d)(2) to develop a TMDL for dioxin in the context of inconclusive and diverse
scientific data regarding the toxicity of dioxin.").
167. See Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Rasmussen, 37 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1845, at *5
("load allocations for nonpoint sources 'are best estimates of the loading, which may range
from reasonably accurate estimates to gross allotments, depending on the availability of
data and appropriate techniques for predicting the loading.' 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(g)."). See
also 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 925 (1996) (summarizing the view of an EPA official that
"[r]egulators use TMDLs when calculating pretreatment standards and discharge limits on
point sources of pollution, but similar mandatory controls can not be imposed on nonpoint
sources of pollution").
168. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (1994).
169. States have the authority to define the uses for waters within their borders. Water
quality criteria are then defined at levels sufficient to protect the uses defined by the states.
See supra Part I.B.
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merical criteria for its existing narrative criteria. 170 Finally, newly
available scientific evidence may change a state's understanding of
what ambient concentration of a given pollutant must be met to pro-
tect the waterway's uses, such as swimming, defined by the state.
Regardless of the reasons for adopting more protective WQSs,
the result will be that effluent limitations that might once have been
sufficient to ensure compliance with existing WQSs may not protect
against violations of the revised WQSs. Because NPDES permits are
normally issued for a five-year period, while WQSs are revised every
three years, NPDES permits cannot be relied on to ensure compliance
with revised WQSs.171 The problem of ensuring compliance with re-
vised WQSs is unavoidable because although NPDES permits may in-
clude reopener clauses that allow more stringent limitations to be
imposed based on changed circumstances, these clauses are of limited
value because modifying a permit is no easy task. 172 As a result, re-
vised WQSs are unlikely to be met through the relatively static
NPDES permitting process.
3. Changed Conditions in Receiving Waters May Render the
Established Effluent Limitations Ineffective
It is important to note that conditions in receiving water may
change during the five-year term of a point source's NPDES permit.
New conditions may result from unexpected changes in climate or in
the loading of pollutants into the waters. Changes in pollutant loads
may, in turn, be the result of new point or nonpoint contributions to
pollution either within or outside the state.173
170. The Act dictates, for example, that states adopt numerical criteria rather than
narrative standards, for priority toxic pollutants. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(B).
171. See NPDES TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 16, at 3-3 (a "common error" in
drafting the permit cover page is the "[f]ailure to limit the duration of the permit to 5
years").
172. See e.g., Axline & McGinley, supra note 119, at 279 (EPA has conceded that
"[NPDES] permit modification can be a lengthy process." (footnote omitted)).
173. For example, water quality may depend greatly, as it did in the Portland litigation,
on the volume and quality of storm water discharges into the receiving water body. EPA
policy for permitting storm water discharges, however, does not subject the permits to
water quality based effluent limitations. See Water Pollution: Numeric, Water Quality
Based Effluent Limits Do Not Apply to Storm Water Permits, EPA Says, 27 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 840 (Aug. 9, 1996) [hereinafter Storm Water Exemption]. EPA stated that this pol-
icy is "[d]ue to the nature of storm water discharges, and the typical lack of information on
which to base numeric water quality-based effluent limitations (expressed as concentration
and mass)." Id.; see also report of same title, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1480 (Nov. 15, 1996).
Moreover, EPA recently announced a policy that would facilitate effluent trading among
sources within watersheds. See 61 Fed. Reg. 4994 (1996). Such trading may further com-
plicate the judgment permit writers must make about what effluent limitations necessary
for particular sources to ensure that WQSs will be met within the affected watershed over
the course of the permit's five-year duration.
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If these changed circumstances result in degraded water quality,
existing permit effluent limitations may be rendered insufficient to
protect against WQS violations. An effluent limitation that was suffi-
cient when the permit was issued may later prove to be inadequate if
conditions change during the term of the permit. As noted above, the
existence of a reopener clause in the point source's NPDES permit is
unlikely to be of much practical value as permit modification may be
quite challenging. 174
III
NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL AD VOCA TE V. PORTLAND
The preceding discussion has illustrated that the Clean Water
Act's goal of WQS compliance is not presently being met. This is true
despite the fact that point source polluters are theoretically subject to
effluent controls that are more stringent than the otherwise applicable
technology-based limitations. The Article now turns to a considera-
tion of whether and under what circumstances the Clean Water Act
permits citizens to press WQS enforcement claims. The Article will
then investigate whether and when permitting such suits reflects good
public policy. A detailed description of the recent Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals decision in Northwest Environmental Advocate v. Portland
provides the context for conducting a legal and policy analysis of citi-
zen suits. This case is an appropriate point of departure because it
was the first court of appeals decision to hold that a citizen suit may
be brought against a point source when its emissions cause a violation
of state WQSs.
A. The Facts
As required by the Clean Water Act,175 the Portland, Oregon
publicly-owned treatment works (POTW) was issued an NPDES per-
mit that allowed it to discharge pollutants into the Columbia Slough
and the Willamette River. The permit contained a variety of specific,
numerical limits on the pollutants that could be discharged by the
POTW. The permit also anticipated that during some periods of pre-
cipitation, the flow into the POTW would exceed the facility's treat-
ment capacity on between fifty and eighty occasions. The permit
provided that on such occasions, the POTW would discharge un-
treated effluent "through a system of combined sewer overflow (CSO)
outfalls in what is termed a CSO event. '176
174. See supra notes 118 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 20.
176. Northwest Envtl. Advocate v. Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 981 (9th Cir. 1995) cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 2500 (1996).
19971
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The state agency responsible for issuing the NPDES permit for
the POTW did not establish any pollution limits for the discharges
that were allowed at the CSO outfalls during the anticipated CSO
events. 177 Portland's NPDES permit did, however, include a relevant
condition that applied expressly to the CSOs. The condition stated
that "notwithstanding the effluent limitations established by this per-
mit, no wastes shall be discharged and no activities shall be conducted
which will violate [Oregon's] Water Quality Standards. ' 178
Northwest Environmental Advocate (NWEA) decided to file its
citizen suit during the time that the state was drafting a new NPDES
permit for Portland. 179 In its action, NWEA claimed that Portland
had violated the conditions of its existing NPDES permit because the
POTW's discharges during the CSO events were causing violations of
the state WQSs.180 Specifically, NWEA presented evidence that the
state standard for fecal coliform was violated routinely during CSO
events. 18' The district court dismissed the NWEA action, concluding
that the Clean Water Act does not permit citizen suits based on claims
of WQS violations. 182
B. The Majority Opinion
A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dis-
trict court, holding that NWEA could pursue its citizen suit.' 83 The
court had initially agreed with the district court's interpretation of the
Act, 84 but thereafter changed its decision, citing the intervening
177. See id. at 985. The court commented that, "[a]lthough technically the permit
should have established effluent limitations for the CSOs, it appears that the parties in-
tended to omit such requirements. The district court was presented with sufficient evi-
dence from which it could determine that DEQ, as well as Portland, intended this allegedly
unlawful interpretation." Id.
178. Id. The Northwest Envtl. Advocate court distinguished Oregon Natural Re-
sources Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 834 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1987), because WQS compli-
ance was included as a condition of Portland's NPDES permit. 56 F.3d at 989 n.11. In
Oregon Natural Resources Council v. U.S. Forest Service, the Ninth Circuit held that a
citizens group could not bring a citizen suit based on allegations of violations of WQSs that
were not included as permit conditions.
179. See Northwest, 56 F.3d at 981-82.
180. See id. at 981.
181. See id. at 986.
182. See id. at 982.
183. Id. at 979. The court's conclusion is consistent with the much earlier district court
decision in Montgomery Envtl. Coalition v. Fri, 366 F. Supp. 261 (D.D.C. 1973). In that
case, however, the district court suggested that a citizen suit based on a WQS violation
might not be available once the technology-based limitations became effective. See id. at
265 ("it is this Court's firm conviction that water quality standards promulgated pursuant
to the 1965 Act are to constitute a floor level of quality until the stiffer effluent limitations
of the 1972 Act can be implemented.").
184. See Northwest Envtl. Advocate v. Portland, 11 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 1993) (vacated
and withdrawn). During the period between the Ninth Circuit's earlier panel opinion and
its resolution to vacate that decision, two district courts relied on the earlier opinion to
HeinOnline  -- 24 Ecology L.Q. 430 1997
CITIZEN SUITS & WATER QUALITY
Supreme Court decision in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washing-
ton Dep't of Ecology.185 In PUD No. 1, the Supreme Court held that
the certification authority granted to states by section 401 of the Clean
Water Act gives states substantial power to ensure that federal per-
mits would not cause violations of their WQSs. 186 While the PUD No.
1 decision construed section 401 in unexpectedly broad terms,187 that
case did not concern the scope of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit
provision. In reality, the court of appeals' reliance on PUD No. 1 was
no more than a convenient explanation for its decision to alter its ear-
lier holding in Northwest Environmental Advocate.
The court of appeals held that the text of the Clean Water Act
expressly permits a citizen to bring an action based on the violation of
a "condition" of an NPDES permit. 88 The court also concluded that
this reading of the statute was consistent with the Clean Water Act's
legislative history, which indicated that Congress hoped to "improve
enforcement" of the statute by supplementing the water quality-based
system of regulation with technology-based limitations on pollution.
189
The court then explained how its decision was consistent with re-
cent Supreme Court precedent holding that narrative WQSs establish
enforceable standards,190 and with lower court decisions holding that
"citizens [sic] groups may seek to enforce many kinds of permit condi-
tions besides effluent limitations. In fact, permit conditions that
courts commonly enforce under § 505(a) are not effluent limitations,
but rather, requirements for retaining records of discharge sampling
and for filing reports."'191 Finally, the court concluded that the deci-
sion to allow citizen suits for violations of WQSs furthered the pur-
dismiss citizen suits alleging violations of state WQSs. See e.g., Citizens for a Better Env't
v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 861 F. Supp. 889, 913 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd on other grounds, 83
F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1996); Save Our Bays and Beaches v. Honolulu, 904 F. Supp. 1098 (D.
Haw. 1994).
185. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 91
(1994).
186. See supra Part II.C.5. (discussing section 401 authority). The Supreme Court's
decision in PUD No. 1 is analyzed in Healy, supra note 11.
187. See Healy, supra note 11, at 426-27.
188. See 56 F.3d at 986 (footnote omitted), where the court stated that:
The plain language of CWA § 505 authorizes citizens to enforce all permit condi-
tions. That section provides: "[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action... (1)
against any person.., who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard
or limitation under [the Clean Water Act] .... " 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)(A). An
effluent standard or limitation includes "(2) an effluent limitation or other limita-
tion under section 1311 ... or (6) a permit or condition thereof .... 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(f)(2), (0(6) (emphasis added). This language clearly contemplates citizen
suits to enforce "a permit or condition thereof."
Portland holds a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, and
the water quality standards are conditions of its permit.
189. See id. at 986; see also id. at 987.
190. See id. at 981, 987-88 (discussing PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County).
191. Id. at 988 (citations omitted).
19971
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pose of the Clean Water Act because it would result in the control of
discharges that would otherwise be unregulated because the applica-
ble effluent limitations are not defined, or because the WQSs cannot
be translated into effluent limitations. 192
C. The Dissenters' Opinions
Judge Kleinfeld dissented from this decision, believing that the
panel's initial, albeit withdrawn decision was correct and that the in-
tervening Supreme Court decision had not dictated a different re-
sult.193 He also argued that allowing citizen suit enforcement of
WQSs constituted misguided public policy.194
Portland petitioned the Ninth Circuit for an en banc rehearing of
the case. The court rejected that petition. 195 Four judges of the Ninth
Circuit would have considered the case en banc and dissented from
the order denying rehearing. 96 These judges argued that the panel
decision had erred by "significantly reshap[ing] federal environmental
law."'1 97 They contended that the result of the panel decision
"promises to invite excessive, costly, and counterproductive citizen
suits, funded by the taxpayers for the enforcement of standards that
are imprecise and astronomically costly to the municipalities af-
fected."'1 98 They contended that the panel had seriously misread the
role that WQSs play in the Clean Water Act's regulatory scheme:
While state water quality standards may serve as an important source
of authority for a state to impose additional pollution control require-
ments, they should not be used as a vehicle for flooding the federal
courts with citizen suits against permittees who are meeting the spe-
cific requirements (i.e., effluent limitations) outlined in their
permits.199
The remainder of this Article addresses the legal and public pol-
icy issues raised by the Ninth Circuit's decision to permit the NWEA
citizen suit. It will first address the legal question of whether the
Clean Water Act allows a private party to bring a citizen suit against a
point source based on a claim that the source's discharges are causing
WQS violations. The Article will then address whether allowing such
192. See id. at 989.
193. See id. at 991 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
194. See id. at 992-93.
195. See Northwest Envtl. Advocate v. Portland, 74 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 1996) (denial of
petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc).
196. Id. (opinion of O'Scannlain, Circuit Judge, joined by Hall, T.G. Nelson, and
Kleinfeld, Circuit Judges, dissenting from order rejecting suggestion for rehearing en
banc).
197. Id. at 946.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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citizen suits constitutes flawed public policy because of the high costs
to the court system and to point sources.
IV
DOES THE CLEAN WATER ACT PERMIT DIRECT CITIZEN
SUIT ENFORCEMENT OF WQSs?
In analyzing the legal question of whether and under what cir-
cumstances citizen suits are authorized by the Clean Water Act, the
Article considers (1) the statute's text, 200 (2) the legislative intent with
respect to citizen suits, 20 1 and (3) the overall legislative purpose be-
200. E.g., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) ("In a
statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and
when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in
all but the most extraordinary circumstances, is finished." (citation omitted)); United
States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (consideration of a statute's mean-
ing "must begin ... with the language of the statute itself"). This "beginning point" for
statutory construction reflects a basic principle that the governed should have fair notice of
the laws that apply to them. See William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Inter-
pretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 339 (1990) ("Citizens ought to be
able to open up the statute books and have a good idea of their rights and obligations.
When the statute seems plainly to say one thing, courts should be reluctant to alter that
directive."). Interpreting a provision by principal reference to its text is strongly supported
as well by the federal constitutional structure, which assigns Congress the power to legis-
late. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REG-
ULATORY STATE 113 (1990) ("In a democratic system, one with an electorally accountable
legislature and separated powers, it is usually thought impermissible for courts to invoke
considerations that cannot be traced to an authoritative textual instrument."); Daniel A.
Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 283 (1989)
("Legislative supremacy, as a doctrine of statutory interpretation, is grounded in the notion
that, except when exercising the power of judicial review, courts are subordinate to legisla-
tures." (footnote omitted)).
201. A well-accepted next step in the search to understand the meaning of statutory
terms or to strengthen the construction that a court has given to the text is to consider
extrinsic evidence of a statute's meaning. That extrinsic evidence is most often legislative
history. Professors Eskridge and Frickey, e.g., have written that:
Original legislative expectations are important in a democracy where the legisla-
ture is the primary source of lawmaking. Evidence of the statute's background,
together with the text, at least suggests the original meaning of the statute. To the
extent that the Court can recover that original meaning, it subserves democratic
values by enforcing the law as the legislature understood it, thus limiting judicial
discretion and power.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 200, at 356; see SUNSTEIN, supra note 200, at 128 ("one
cannot get a sense of the context and purpose of a statutory enactment without a reading
of the legislative history .... [M]ost fundamentally, it is not clear where judges are to look
if they fail to look at the legislative history. Without reference to the history, interpreta-
tion can become less bounded."); JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 46
(1982) ("The statutory text is basic and central. But if a law is to be a vital force in society,
the text usually must be seen as part of a flow of policy-making activity that originates
before the text is voted and continues after it is on the books."); Eskridge & Frickey, supra
note 200, at 353 (identifies "Specific & General Legislative History" as the second "Most
Concrete Inquiry" into a statute's meaning).
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hind the Clean Water Act.20 2 Although each is a well accepted source
for understanding the meaning of a statute, the text is undoubtedly
the most important source.20 3 The Clean Water Act clearly provides
that suits may be brought alleging that a point source's emissions have
caused violations of the state WQSs, but only when WQS compliance
is a condition of the point source's NPDES permit. The legislative
history and statutory purposes are much more ambiguous, but in any
event do not clearly indicate that the text's literal meaning was not
intended.
A. The Text of the Citizen Suit Provision
The majority in Northwest Environmental Advocates relied prin-
cipally on the text of the Clean Water Act to support its holding that a
citizen suit could be based on the alleged WQS violations if WQS
compliance was an NPDES permit condition. The Clean Water Act's
citizen suit provision states in relevant part that:
[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own be-
half ... against any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of (A)
an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard
or limitation .... 204
A close analysis of this text strongly supports the conclusion that citi-
zen suits are authorized to enforce WQSs when WQS compliance is a
202. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983)("It is a well-
established canon of statutory construction that a court should go beyond the literal lan-
guage of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of the stat-
ute." (citations omitted)). See generally, HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374-80
(William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey eds., 1994) (defining purposivist approach to statu-
tory interpretation). Professor Llewellyn has made the claim that it is necessary for courts
to look to the underlying policy of the statute when construing its terms. He writes that:
If a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of some assumed purpose.
A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is nonsense.
If a statute is to be merged into a going system of law, moreover, the court must
do the merging, and must in so doing take account of the policy of the statute -
or else substitute its own version of such policy.
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 400 (1950); see also Patri-
cia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Term, 68 IowA L. REV. 195, 199 (1983) (suggesting that a court "ignores reality" if,
in interpreting a statute, it stops at the words of the statute and fails to consider context
including "the problems giving rise to the statute").
203. See Estate of Cowart, 505 U.S. at 475. Indeed, even for scholars who are not
textualists, an important and potentially decisive starting point is the text of the statute.
See e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 200, at 353 (stating that the "Practical Reasoning
Model of Statutory Interpretation" begins with the "Most Concrete Inquiry," which is the
"Statutory Text."). For a discussion of the flaws of the textualist approach to interpreta-
tion, even when it yields a result that is favorable to the environment, see generally Healy,
supra note 11.
204. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1994).
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specific condition of a point source's NPDES permit. The textual case
for citizen suit enforcement disappears, however, when no such condi-
tion exists in the NPDES permit.
1. The Case Where WQS Compliance Is an NPDES
Permit Condition
Although the citizen suit provision quoted above makes no ex-
plicit reference to WOS violations, the Act's definition of "effluent
standard or limitation" applicable to the citizen suit provision indi-
cates that citizens can sue for certain WQS violations.20 5 One type of
"effluent standard or limitation" specified by the text is "a permit or
condition thereof issued under section 1342 of this title, which is in
effect under this chapter. '20 6 This means that the Clean Water Act
expressly provides that a citizen suit may be brought, if the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant point source has violated a condition of its
NPDES permit.207 The text of the statute thus establishes that the
availability of citizen suits to enforce WQSs is dependent on WQS
compliance being an NPDES permit condition.
In light of the text of the Clean Water Act, Northwest Environ-
mental Advocate was correctly decided. This is the case because the
defendant point source in Northwest Environmental Advocate was re-
quired to comply with state WQSs as a condition of its NPDES per-
mit.208 In fact, the Northwest Environmental Advocate court
distinguished an earlier Ninth Circuit decision, which had prohibited a
citizen suit for a WQS violation, on the grounds that the relevant
NPDES permit in that case did not make WQS compliance a permit
condition.209
205. Id. § 1365(f).
206. Id. § 1365(f)(6).
207. The reference to 33 U.S.C. § 1342 in § 1365(f)(6) is to section 402 of the Act,
which establishes the NPDES permitting system for point sources. Because of this statu-
tory definition, interpretations of the Act that focus on requiring a citizen suit claimant to
show a violation of an "effluent standard or limitation" have little persuasive value on the
question of whether a suit can be based on an alleged violation of a WQS when WQS
compliance is a condition of the source's NPDES permit. See Save Our Community v.
EPA, 971 F.2d 1155, 1162 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Without the violation of either (1) an effluent
standard or limitation under the CWA, or (2) an order issued with respect to these stan-
dards and limitations, the district court lacks jurisdiction to act.").
208. 56 F.3d at 985. In support of its adoption of this definition of "effluent standard
or limitation," the court stated that other courts had allowed citizen suits to be brought
based on claims of violations of other permit conditions. See id. at 988 ("By applying
§ 505(f)(6), several courts have held that citizens groups may seek to enforce many kinds
of permit conditions besides effluent limitations. In fact, permit conditions that courts
commonly enforce under § 505(a) are not effluent limitations, but rather, requirements for
retaining records of discharge sampling and for filing reports." (citations omitted)).
209. See id. at 989 n.11 ("When this Court and other courts have held that citizens may
not enforce water quality standards under § 505(a)(1), they addressed standards that were
not included in a NPDES permit." (citation omitted)).
1997]
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Because the text of the Clean Water Act makes the availability of
citizen suits dependent on whether or not the defendant point source's
NPDES permit makes WQS compliance an explicit condition, the
question of how permit conditions are defined becomes extremely im-
portant.210 Whether WQSs are defined as conditions in an NPDES
permit typically will depend on the discretion of permit writers. Fed-
eral guidance, as well as state regulations, appear to grant permit writ-
ers the authority, but not the obligation, to impose WQS compliance
as a permit condition.211 One notable exception to this discretion
arises when the WQS compliance condition is mandated by a state
certification required by section 401.212
210. It is unclear how many NPDES permits include WQS compliance as a permit
condition. Recent reported cases, however, provide several examples of that condition.
See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 861 F. Supp. at 913 (court dis-
misses on authority of the vacated panel opinion in Northwest Environmental Advocates
citizen suit claim based on violation of state water quality standards); Save Our Bays and
Beaches v. Honolulu, 904 F. Supp. 1098 (City's NPDES permits for its POTWs, "[i]n addi-
tion to effluent limitations ... contain express prohibitions against causing violations of
state water quality standards in the receiving waters." Id. at 1106. The court bars citizen
suit claims based on violations of the WQSs because of the initial panel decision in North-
west Environmental Advocates.); Culbertson v. Coats American, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1572
(N.D. Ga. 1995) (permit requires compliance with Georgia Rules on water quality, includ-
ing a narrative standard for color. Court relies on later Northwest Environmental Advo-
cates decision and holds that citizen suit action may be based on WQS violations.). Cf
Miami-Dade, at 2 (a WQS is included in a draft permit in the form of an effluent limit).
211. EPA's guidance to NPDES permit writers does not include compliance with state
WQSs as one of the many standard conditions that should be included in the permit to
"help ensure uniformity and consistency of all permits issued by NPDES States or EPA
Regional offices." NPDES TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 16, at 3-12. The guidance also
gives permit writers the discretion to include "special conditions." Id. at 3-14. The manual
states that:
Ultimately, special conditions are designed to provide an additional measure of
control for the reduction of discharges to waters of the United States. As such,
the permit writers should not feel constrained to the special conditions discussed
above. In many cases, the special conditions section can be used to promote
Agency initiatives and to foster compliance with policies.
Id. Certainly, ensuring compliance with state WQSs "foster[s] compliance with policies" of
the Clean Water Act, and agencies accordingly have authority to include WQS compliance
as a special condition. State regulations may be similarly ambiguous. For example, regula-
tions for Kentucky provide that:
(4) Water quality standards and state requirements shall be included [as condi-
tions] as applicable. Any requirements in addition to or more stringent than
EPA's effluent limitations guidelines or standards shall be included, when neces-
sary to: (a) Achieve water quality standards established under KRS Chapter 224
and administrative regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, including any nar-
rative criteria ....
401 Ky. Admin. Reg. § 5:065.
212. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994); see In re Haverhill, Wastewater Div., 24 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 40,205, 40,205 (E.P.A. E.A.B. April 14, 1994), where the EAB stated that:
The permit also requires that: "Combined Sewer Overflows [CSO] must not cause
violations of State Water Quality Standards." Id. The CSO-related provisions
described above were contained in the draft permit. In its letter certifying the
draft permit, the State wrote that: "None of the conditions of the permit may be
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In addition to making permit conditions enforceable through citi-
zen suits, the Clean Water Act's definition of "effluent standard or
limitation" is significant because it indicates that actionable statutory
violations may occur even when the permit-issuing agency is itself re-
sponsible for the fact that the applicable NPDES permit does not con-
tain effluent limitations necessary to meet WQSs. Specifically, section
365(f)(1) provides that "effective July 1, 1973," a citizen suit may be
brought based on "an unlawful act under subsection (a) of section
1311 of this title .... -213 Section 1311 provides that "[e]xcept as in
compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342,
and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person
shall be unlawful. '2 14 Section 1342, in turn, provides for the NPDES
system for permitting point sources. 215 The effect of these provisions
is that "the discharge of any pollutant without NPDES permit is an
unlawful act under § 1311(a). '216
The Fifth Circuit recently interpreted these provisions to impose
liability after the effective date of July 1, 1973, even though the per-
mitting agency may be responsible for the fact that a point source is
without an NPDES permit. This interpretation supports the conclu-
sion that a point source's failure to comply with WQS permit condi-
tions will not be excused on the ground that the permit writer should
have explicitly included the actual effluent limits needed to ensure
WQS compliance. 217
made less stringent without violating the requirements of the State Act and the
Massachusetts Water Quality Standards." (footnote omitted).
See also In re Boise Cascade Corp., 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 40,116, at 40,119 n.7
as to when limits are required by certification. For a general discussion of § 401 certifica-
tion, see supra Part II.C.5. The Section 401 certification is, of course, required by the Clean
Water Act only when a federal permit is being issued. 33 U.S.C. § 1341. Federal permit-
ting activities that trigger the certification requirement include permits that result in
nonpoint source pollution as well as point source pollution. See Idaho TMDL Program,
supra note 158. In the context of NPDES permitting, federal permits are now issued by
EPA in only ten states. See supra note 118 (40 states now have authority to administer
their own NPDES programs).
213. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(1).
214. Id. § 1311(a).
215. Id. § 1342.
216. Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 559 (5th Cir. 1996). See also
Axline & McGinley, supra note 119, at 257 ("Together, sections 301(a) and 402 establish
the essential structure for regulating point sources of pollution-no discharge of a pollu-
tant is allowed without a permit.").
217. See Sierra Club, 73 F.3d at 562 (quoting with approval United States v. Frezzo
Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3rd Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980)). The
Fifth Circuit stated that this result was consistent with EPA's interpretation of the CWA
and with the decisions of other courts. See 73 F.3d at 562 ("numerous courts have allowed
suits by citizens against persons allegedly discharging pollutants without a permit, despite
the fact that the discharger was complying with applicable effluent limitations or that no
applicable effluent limitation was in place." (citations omitted)).
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In sum, the Clean Water Act's text provides strong evidence that
a citizen suit may be brought against a point source when WQS com-
pliance is a condition of the source's NPDES permit and when its dis-
charges cause a WQS violation.
2. The Case Where WQS Compliance Is Not an NPDES
Permit Condition
The Clean Water Act provisions discussed above also provide
strong evidence that although citizens are authorized to sue when
WQS compliance is a condition of the relevant NPDES permit, they
have no authority to sue when no such condition is included in the
permit. Congress included a permit shield provision in section 402(k)
of the Clean Water Act. That provision states that "[c]ompliance with
a permit issued pursuant to this section shall be deemed compliance,
for purposes of section[ ] . . . 1365 of this title, with section[ ]
1311 .. . of this title .... ",218 This means that the Act "defines compli-
ance with a NPDES ... permit as compliance with Section 301 for the
purposes of the CWA's enforcement provisions. 2 19 The Supreme
Court has stated that "[t]he purpose of [the shield provision] seems to
be . . . to relieve [permit holders] of having to litigate in an enforce-
ment action the question of whether their permits are sufficiently
strict.12 20 The permit shield provision supports a reading of the Act's
text as barring citizen suits to enforce WQSs in cases where the rele-
vant NPDES permit includes neither sufficiently stringent effluent
limits nor WQS compliance as a permit condition.221
EPA itself, whose expertise in enforcing the CWA is entitled to some deference,
has recognized that citizens have the right to sue 'Coastal Subcategory' operators
who are discharging produced water without a permit. At the time EPA made
this statement, it had never issued such permits and had only issued effluent limi-
tations on the oil and grease content of produced water." (footnote and citation
omitted)
Id.
But cf Hughey v. JMS Dev't Corp., 78 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996) (court seems to hold that
citizen suit may not be brought where violation results from administrative glitch in failing
to issue required permit).
218. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k). 33 U.S.C § 1365 is the citizen suit provision, while section
1311 makes it illegal to discharge a pollutant without a permit.
219. Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak, 12 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 1993).
220. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977).
221. A recent law review Article has argued, however, that the permit shield provision
does not apply when the permit has not been issued in accordance with the Clean Water
Act's requirements. See Axline & McGinley, supra note 119, at 287:
Under the reasoning of DuPont a permit that is issued in violation of a require-
ment in the CWA for permit issuance, such as the requirement in section
402(a)(1) that the issuing agency apply either national effluent limitations or use
BPJ to set BAT or BCT standards for all pollutants, would not be protected by
the section 402(k) shield.
Under this reasoning, the shield might not apply when a permit-issuing agency has failed to
incorporate effluent limits that are sufficiently stringent to prevent WQS violations.
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Other provisions of the Act reinforce this NPDES permit condi-
tion dependent approach to the question of whether citizens may sue
for WQS violations. Recall that both the TMDL 222 and the Toxic Hot
Spot ICS 223 provisions include methods for incorporating into NPDES
permits specific effluent limits that are sufficiently stringent to ensure
compliance with WQS. Section 401 also allows states to demand that
permits issued by EPA contain conditions necessary to ensure that
state WQSs will not be violated. 224 All of these provisions allow the
permittee and affected states to rely on the terms and conditions of
the NPDES permit to determine whether point source discharges
comply with Clean Water Act requirements. Because the statute pro-
vides that point sources may rely on the terms and conditions of
NPDES permits as being the extent of the controls that will be im-
posed under the Clean Water Act, it would be improper to permit
citizen suits to enforce WQSs when WQS compliance is not an explicit
permit condition.
In sum, the Clean Water Act's text presents a strong case that
citizen suits may be brought in response to alleged point source viola-
tions of state WQSs if that point source's NPDES permit includes
WQS compliance as a condition. 225 As noted above, the statutory text
is the most reliable evidence of a statute's meaning.226 Given this
strong textual support for the NPDES permit condition dependence
of citizen suit availability, only very strong evidence to the contrary,
drawn from the legislative intent or the Act's underlying purpose,
could overcome the textual interpretation and dictate that such a citi-
zen suit is not available.227
B. The Legislative Intent Regarding the Availability of Citizen Suits
Key portions of the legislative history provide evidence that Con-
gress intended to limit the availability of citizen WQS enforcement
222. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d). See supra Part I.C.2.
223. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(). See supra Part I.C.3.
224. 33 U.S.C. §1341(d).
225. See Northwest Envtl. Advocate v. Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 991 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("This reasoning [based on the statutory text] has force, and I am
troubled by the difficulty of applying Oregon Natural Resources Council in the face of this
logical, literal construction.").
226. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
227. The court in Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak, 12 F.3d 353, 359-60
(2d Cir. 1993), had held that requirements established only by state law are not enforceable
under the citizen suit provision. See id. ("even if Atlantic States is right about New York
law, the action would fail because New York would be implementing a regulatory scheme
broader than the CWA .... and such broader state schemes are unenforceable through
section 505 citizen suits.") (citation omitted). This reasoning does not apply to bar citizen
suits based on WQS violations when the permit requires WQS compliance as a condition.
This is because section 1365(f)(6) defines "effluent standard or limitation" to include per-
mit conditions and thus makes the permit conditions requirements of federal law.
1997]
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suits. Legislative intent therefore undercuts somewhat the strong tex-
tual case discussed above for permitting citizens to sue for some WQS
violations. Note, however, that the strong textual case relied upon the
availability of a citizen suit to enforce permit conditions. Nothing in
the Clean Water Act's legislative history indicates that Congress in-
tended that certain permit conditions, for example those mandating
WQS compliance, should not be subject to full enforcement.
The Senate Report on the predecessor bill to the Clean Water
Act strongly suggests, however, that WQSs were not intended to be
enforceable by themselves, and particularly not in the context of pri-
vate enforcement actions. The Senate Report stated broadly that
"[w]ater quality will be a measure of program effectiveness and per-
formance, not a means of elimination and enforcement. '228 In dis-
cussing the citizen suit provision, the Report emphasized that citizen
suit enforcement actions would not rely on a "court-developed defini-
tion of water quality, '229 but would instead involve courts considering
"manageable and precise benchmarks for enforcement. '230 A core
concern about permitting citizen suit enforcement of WQSs is that
these suits will not provide courts with clear standards for adjudica-
tion.231 Indeed, the Report indicated that WQSs did not provide this
kind of precision. 232 The Report stated, finally, that the administra-
228. S. REP. No. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3675.
229. S. REP. No. 92-414, (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3745, where the Senate
Committee stated that:
Section 505 would not substitute a "common law" or court-developed definition
of water quality. An alleged violation of an effluent control limitation or stan-
dard, would not require reanalysis of technological in [sic] other considerations at
the enforcement stage. These matters will have been settled in the administrative
procedure leading to the establishment of such effluent control provision. There-
fore, an objective evidentiary standard will have to be met by any citizen who
brings an action under this section.
230. Id. The Senate Committee stated that:
Enforcement of pollution regulations is not a technical matter beyond the compe-
tence of the courts. The citizen suit provision is consistent with principles underly-
ing the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, that is the development of clear and
identifiable requirements. Such requirements should provide manageable and
precise benchmarks for enforcement.
231. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
232. S. REP. No. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3675 ("Water quality
standards, in addition to their deficiencies in relying on the assimilative capacity of receiv-
ing waters, often cannot be translated into effluent limitations-defendable in court tests,
because of the imprecision of models for water quality and the effects of effluents in most
waters."). In his dissent, Judge Kleifeld made a similar point about the enforceability of
WQSs:
[W]e previously concluded on the basis of analysis of several additional provi-
sions of the statute that it is not the permittee who must comply with the water
quality standards, but rather the issuing authority, which has a "duty ... to in-
clude in the permit end-of-pipe effluent limitations that will ensure that water
quality standards are met." Northwest Environmental, 11 F.3d at 908. That
makes sense in light of what the Supreme Court said in Jefferson County. Con-
gress meant for the issuing authority to decide upon end-of-pipe effluent stan-
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tive permitting process should generate clear standards, which would
be the only standards enforceable by citizen suits or by government
enforcement.2 33 In other words, the legislative history indicates that
Congress did not intend to authorize citizen suit enforcement of
WQSs under all circumstances.
Notwithstanding the concerns raised above about the role that
WQSs should play in the Act's enforcement scheme, language in the
Senate Report supports the statutory interpretations presented in the
previous section. The Senate Report stated, for example, that citizens
were granted the authority to bring suit to enforce the terms of "any
condition of any permit issued under Section 402."' 234 Thus, the Re-
port provides inferential support for the type of citizen suit permitted
in Northwest Environmental Advocate.
C. The Purpose of the Clean Water Act
Nothing in the Clean Water Act's broad purposes contradicts or
otherwise undercuts the strong textual case for permitting citizen suits
for the enforcement of WQSs when WQS compliance is a condition of
the point source's permit. The express purposes of the Clean Water
Act call for reliance on the two regulatory approaches discussed in
this Article: uniform technology-based limitations on point sources
and supplementary limitations for the protection of water quality.235
The first stated goal is that "the discharge of pollutants into the navi-
dards for the permit, which it could derive from water quality standards, when
Congress allowed citizens' suits to enforce permit limitations. It did not mean for
citizens' suits to proceed on the basis of permit violations, where the permittee
complied with end-of-pipe discharge limitations but the water still wound up be-
ing too polluted. A water quality standard should be deemed to be not among
those authorized by the statute for purposes of citizen suit enforcement.
The City of Portland persuasively argues that, if the water quality standard were
used as a basis for punishing sewage overflows during rainy weather, then the
detailed end-of-pipe discharge limitations in the permit designed for this precise
problem would have no practical effect. ...
Northwest Envtl. Advocate v. Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 991 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
233. S. REP. No. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3746 where the Senate
Committee stated that:
The standards for which enforcement would be sought either under administra-
tive enforcement or through citizen enforcement procedures are the same.
Therefore the participation of citizens in the courts seeking enforcement of water
pollution control requirements should not result in inconsistent policy. Whether
abatement is sought by an agency or by a citizen, there should be a considerable
record available to the courts in any enforcement proceeding resulting from the
Federal and State administrative standard-setting procedures. Consequently, the
factual basis for enforcement of requirements would be available at the time en-
forcement is sought, and the issue before the courts would be a factual one of
whether there had been compliance.
234. Id. ("citizens are granted authority to bring enforcement actions for violations
of ... any condition of any permit issued under section 402.").
235. See supra Part I.A.
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gable waters be eliminated by 1985. ' '236 This purpose reflects the
Act's concern that sources of pollution limit their pollution discharges
and that this limitation be accomplished through the application of
uniform, technology-based standards to various categories of sources.
The Act also states that its "objective ... is to restore and main-
tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters, ' 2 37 and that "wherever attainable, an interim goal of water
quality which provides for the protections and propagation of fish,
shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water
be achieved by July 1, 1983."238 These goals reflect the Act's concern
with ensuring healthful water quality and articulate an environmental
protection purpose supplementary to the technology-based effluent
controls mandated by the Act. This purpose is entirely consistent with
permitting direct citizen suit enforcement of state WQSs, and espe-
cially WQSs adopted to protect water dependent species and recrea-
tional activities.
Because the Act's two purposes parallel its dual regulatory re-
gimes for the control of discharges, it would be difficult to articulate
any convincing argument for ignoring the statutory text that estab-
lishes this basic regulatory structure. In other words, nothing about
the purpose of the Clean Water Act calls into doubt the conclusion
that the text of the Act authorizes citizen suits for WQS violations
when WQS compliance is an NPDES permit condition.
In sum, the text of the Clean Water Act provides strong support
for the result reached by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. When
WQS compliance is a condition of a source's NPDES permit, citizens
should be able to bring an enforcement action against that point
source if its discharges cause violations of state WQSs. Neither the
legislative history of the Act nor its purposes present a compelling
case for rejecting the strong textual argument for allowing citizen suits
under these limited circumstances. Moreover, the text and intent of
the Clean Water Act also dictate that citizen suits are not authorized
when WQS compliance is not an express condition of an NPDES
permit.
V
DOES CITIZEN SUIT ENFORCEMENT OF WQSs CONSTITUTE
GOOD PUBLIC POLICY?
This Article will now consider whether allowing citizen suits to
enforce WQSs is good public policy. The previous section addressed
236. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1994).
237. Id. § 1251(a).
238. Id. § 1251(a)(2).
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the legal questions surrounding citizen suit enforcement. These ques-
tions are, as a matter of statutory construction, almost always resolved
by reference to the desires of the enacting legislature. This section is
not similarly constrained by a concern with legislative supremacy.
Rather than focusing on congressional expectations and drafting, this
section will address the public policy question and will consider, when
appropriate, any practical lessons to be learned from the statute's ac-
tual implementation over the past twenty-five years.239 When rele-
vant, practical experience is important because the issue of citizen suit
enforcement is not being resolved in a vacuum, but rather implicates
the overall implementation and effectiveness of the Clean Water Act.
As in the preceding section, this public policy analysis will con-
sider citizen suit enforcement both when WQS compliance is made a
specific condition of an NPDES permit and when WQS compliance is
not a condition. This section begins with an analysis of the arguments
that have been made against citizen suit enforcement of WQSs. Each
of these arguments counsels some degree of restraint with respect to
allowing citizen suits. The section then presents several policy argu-
ments in favor of citizens suits. In my view, based on a weighing of
the conflicting arguments, the basic distinction drawn by the statute
and recognized by the Northwest Environmental Advocate court re-
flects the best public policy result. Citizen suits to enforce WQSs
should be permitted only when WQS compliance is a specific condi-
tion of a point source's NPDES permit.
A. Public Policy Arguments Against Permitting Citizen Suit
Enforcement of WQSs
Articulated objections to citizen suit enforcement of WQSs fall
into three basic categories: arguments that courts will be forced to ex-
ceed their institutional and technical competence to resolve such
cases; arguments that permit holders will be treated unfairly if such
claims are allowed; and arguments that allowing such claims will lead
to an inefficiently high level of enforcement. The Article will discuss
each of these objections in turn below. It will focus particularly on
how the strength of the objections may depend on whether WOS com-
pliance is included as an NPDES permit condition.
1. Institutional Problems Faced by Courts
Courts may confront serious institutional problems in adjudicat-
ing citizen suits alleging WQS violations. Courts generally play an un-
239. Cf. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 200, at 353 (in describing the "hierarchy of
sources" to be considered by a court in interpreting a statute, the authors identify the
relevance of the "Evolution of the Statute" as well as "Current Policy," which is also the
"Most Abstract Inquiry").
1997]
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controversial role in adjudicating Clean Water Act enforcement
claims when they apply bright line rules to determine whether dis-
charges violate the Act. For example, in the paradigmatic enforce-
ment case, a point source will be held liable for violating its NPDES
permit if the source's mandatory report of discharges shows that it
discharged pollutants at levels exceeding what was allowed under its
NPDES permit.240
Adjudication under these circumstances is straightforward and
uncontroversial because the court is required merely to compare re-
ported point source discharges with the levels mandated by the
source's NPDES permit.241 Whether courts should have jurisdiction
to entertain citizen suits in a nontraditional context may depend on
whether the court will be called upon to make the same type of uncon-
troversial determinations in the new context. In a recent case, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether citizens should be
permitted to press claims of statutory violations in one nontraditional
situation.242 The citizens in Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co. claimed
that a point source had violated the zero discharge limit for the dis-
charge of pollutants in the absence of a permit. The court concluded
that the citizen's claim could be heard because a bright line rule ap-
plied and the court would not be forced to balance factors to reach a
complex judgment.243 As in the traditional case of an NPDES viola-
tion documented by mandatory reporting, the court did not have to be
concerned about intruding on the role of the EPA or a state agency
regarding the administration of the Act and the definition of enforce-
ment or substantive policy. The Clean Water Act plainly mandates
240. E.g., Connecticut Fund for the Env't, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 660 F. Supp 1397 (D.
Conn. 1987); see generally, PERCIVAL, supra note 3, at 1078.
241. For the purposes of this Article, it is assumed that citizen suits reflect good public
policy in the context of these well accepted claims of illegality that do not necessitate the
exercise of difficult judgments. This Article does not address, moreover, the question of
whether citizen suits are a constitutional form of enforcement of federal statutes. For a
discussion of this question, see Cass R. Sunstein, Article II Revisionism, 92 MICH. L. REV.
131 (1993).
242. Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996).
243. See id. at 567, where the court stated that:
[T]hese rare cases where courts are called upon to determine whether a substance
is a pollutant do not require a "complex balancing" of biological, technological
and economic factors, such as EPA must undertake when promulgating effluent
standards. That is, the court will not be asked to analyze the level of discharge,
the character of the receiving waterway, and the cost of achieving various permit
limitations. Rather, Congress has already set the permit limitation in such
cases-zero discharge. A court need only apply the statutory definition to deter-
mine if the substance in question is a pollutant. If it determines that the sub-
stance is a pollutant, and the defendant is discharging it at all without a permit,
then there has been a violation of § 1311(a). We do not think that this task is
beyond the competence of a court.
[Vol. 24:393
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that point sources may not discharge pollutants into waters of the
United States without a permit.244
If courts have jurisdiction to hear citizen claims based on WQS
violations, their determinations regarding the existence of violations
are likely to be more difficult and controversial than in the situation
described above. 245 Courts may have to resolve questions of both en-
forcement and substantive policy raised by these new claims. Impos-
ing Clean Water Act liability for violations of WQSs in suits brought
by private citizens will force courts to consider several issues includ-
ing: the existence of multiple pollution sources affecting the quality of
receiving waters; the use of compliance schedules in defining WQSs;
and the applicability of mixing zones to the determination of whether
WQSs have been violated. 246 To be sure, the discussion that follows
shows that these are problematic enforcement issues. These issues do
not, however, warrant reaching the conclusion that citizen suits to en-
force WQSs should be barred in all contexts. 247 Instead, these issues
militate in favor of courts exercising restraint in their consideration of
WQS-based claims. For example, courts might require citizen suit
plaintiffs to show that the defendant point source's discharges clearly
caused the alleged WQS violation.2 48
244. See id. at 569 n.37, where the court suggests that courts should be more suspicious
about allowing citizen suit claims, when the underlying issue of compliance involves a diffi-
cult judgment or question of policy:
Where EPA has not promulgated a permit or limitation for a particular discharge,
it may be because EPA lacks the resources to do so or because the discharge is
not a priority. Occasionally, however, it may be because EPA questions whether
the discharged substance is a pollutant at all. In such a case, it is likely that the
substance may not clearly fit within the statutory definition and that there will be
little regulatory guidance from EPA. In a citizen suit brought under these circum-
stances, courts should exercise restraint to avoid stretching the term "pollutant"
too far.
245. The legislative history shows that Congress understood this problem and accord-
ingly indicated that WQSs would not be enforceable in either public or private actions. See
supra Part IV.B.
246. In addition to these troublesome judgments, courts may simply be required to
determine whether violations of unclear WQSs have occurred. See, e.g., In re Florida
Power Co., Op. No. 61, 1977 WL 28248, at *2 (E.P.A.G.C.) (Florida standard related to
thermal discharges depends on whether "monitoring produces evidence of substantial dam-
age [to aquatic life and vegetation].") (emphasis added).
247. Concerns about the difficulty of enforcing uncertain requirements in the context
of citizen suits animated in part the Second Circuit's decision that a citizen could not seek
enforcement of air quality standards defined under the Clean Air Act, even though a state
implementation plan appeared to require state compliance with that standard. See Wilder
v. Thomas, 854 F.2d 605, 615-16 (2d Cir. 1988). The court states that its decision "effec-
tuat[es] both the congressional purpose of fostering [citizen] enforcement and the equally
important purpose of providing specific, objective standards for citizen suits." Id. at 616.
248. Cf William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 40 (1975):
The courts may refuse to enforce foolish or perverse applications of a statute.
There are precedents for judicial refusal to enforce the law .... [I]f giving courts
a discretionary power to decline to enforce the law is tolerable, then the major
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a. Multiple Pollution Sources
In his dissent in Northwest Environmental Advocates v. Portland,
Judge Kleinfeld argued that allowing citizen suits based on WQS vio-
lations is misguided because courts will have great difficulty in identi-
fying a particular point source as responsible for the violation.2 49 He
argued that courts should not decide the issue of a specific source's
liability for degraded water quality because a WQS violation is the
result of the discharges of upstream sources as well.250  Judge
Kleinfeld's comments have even greater force in light of the fact that
WQS compliance is often dependent on flow conditions, particularly
flow volume,251 and may be influenced by upstream NPDES permit
violations.25 2 Neither flow conditions nor upstream violations are
within the control of a downstream point source. Judge Kleinfeld's
dissent suggested that public enforcement efforts may offer a better
response to WQS violations than citizen suit enforcement, presumably
because public officials are better placed to decide how readily the
WQS violations could have been avoided and to assign blame for
WQS violations to particular point sources.253
b. Compliance Schedules
Courts considering whether point sources have caused violations
of WQSs may also have to consider the applicability and effect of
cost of discretionary nonenforcement by public enforcement agencies can be
eliminated without abrogating the public monopoly of enforcement.
249. 56 F.3d at 992 ("[WQSs] are too uncertain and amorphous .. for use against
specific polluters.").
250. Id. stating that:
Suppose, hypothetically, that a water quality standard allows for 100 units of a
pollutant, upstream and non-point source polluters discharge 50 units, and the
downstream discharger is permitted to discharge 50 units. If the upstream and
non-point source polluters increase their discharge to 80 units, it does not auto-
matically follow that the downstream discharger should be limited to 20.
251. See Sierra Club v. Browner, 843 F. Supp. 1304, 1313 (D. Minn. 1993) ("According
to the EPA, TMDLs are based on conditions where the water quality standards are not
being met. Nonpoint sources normally have a greater effect on water quality during high
flow conditions, but point sources have a greater effect on water quality during low flow
conditions.").
252. See id. at 1308 finding that:
The EPA responds that at least some of the 1116 waters are those not meeting
water quality standards because a point source is not meeting its permit require-
ments and that these waters are not WQLSs because the effluent limitations re-
quired by other sections of the Act might be stringent enough to implement water
quality standards." (citation omitted).
253. See Northeast Envtl. Advocate, 56 F.3d at 992 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Mention-
ing that "government enforcement authorities ...decided not to prosecute this case
against the City of Portland" and questioning the propriety of limiting the discharges of
downstream sources, based on the aggregate discharges of various upstream sources, Judge
Kleinfeld stated that "[t]he burdens of so severe a limitation may exceed the burdens of
the extra pollution, or enforcement efforts might more appropriately be directed at the
other polluters." Id.
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compliance schedules. Compliance schedules define the date or dates
by which a particular standard or requirement must be met. Many
states incorporate compliance schedules into their WQSs.2 54 Thus,
whether a WQS has been violated at a particular point in time may
depend on whether the particular WQS is currently applicable or is
subject to delayed applicability pursuant to the state's compliance
schedule.2 55 The applicability of a compliance schedule dictates
whether a source is required to comply with a state WQS immediately
or at a later date and is governed by state agency discretion. This
discretion should be exercised by the permit granting agency when it
drafts and issues the NPDES permit for a point source.
256
When a citizen suit is based on a WQS violation, and WQS com-
pliance is a condition of an NPDES permit, the court adjudicating the
claim will not be forced to make an independent judgment about the
applicability of that state's compliance schedule. By including WQS
compliance as a permit condition, the state will have already exercised
its administrative authority over the compliance schedule issue. Even
if the compliance condition is ambiguous and a court has to decide
whether a compliance schedule is applicable to the permit condition,
the state agency will at least have had an initial opportunity to resolve
the issue of the compliance schedule's applicability.257 Allowing citi-
zen suits in such instances might strengthen the permit issuance pro-
cess by encouraging the permit granting agency to focus on WQS
issues thoroughly when drafting the terms and conditions of the per-
mit. In sum, the applicability of compliance schedules does not weigh
254. See In re Star-Kist Caribe, Inc., 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 40,009, 40,011
n.9 (E.P.A. E.A.B. May 26, 1992) ("According to petitioner's Status Report, 29 jurisdic-
tions have provisions in their laws (water quality standards or related regulations, including
permit regulations) that explicitly authorize schedules of compliance in NPDES permits.
Six (6) others have begun, but not completed, the steps necessary to provide for such
schedules." (citations omitted)).
255. See In re Haverhill, Wastewater Div., 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 40,205,
40,206 (E.P.A. E.A.B. April 14, 1994), where the EAB stated that:
It is well established that "[t]he Clean Water Act does not authorize EPA to es-
tablish schedules of compliance in the permit that would sanction pollutant dis-
charges that do not meet applicable state water quality standards." The only
recognized exception to this rule is "when the water quality standard itself (or the
State's implementing regulations) can be fairly construed as authorizing a sched-
ule of compliance." (internal quotations omitted).
256. See In re J&L Specialty Products, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 40,230, 40,234
(E.P.A. E.A.B. June 20, 1994) ("under this [state] regulation [implementing the WQSs],
the permit issuer may, in its discretion, grant a permittee a compliance schedule, provided
that certain preconditions exist, such as the discharger's inability to meet the applicable
effluent limitation."; id. ("The authority to grant a compliance schedule under the Ohio
regulation is purely discretionary.").
257. This type of process-based benefit associated with allowing citizen suits based on
WQS violations is discussed infra Part V.B.
19971
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strongly against citizen suit enforcement of WQSs when WQS compli-
ance is a permit condition.
c. Mixing Zones
The applicability of mixing zones presents one final difficulty that
courts are likely to face if they have jurisdiction over citizen suits
based on claims of WQS violations.258 A mixing zone is an area in
which effluent mixes with the receiving waters. When a mixing zone is
applicable, compliance with state WQSs is monitored outside of the
mixing zone. 259 This means that a point source's discharges will not be
treated as violating the state's WQS, even if water quality within the
mixing zone is significantly lower than what is dictated by the state's
WQS, so long as water quality complies with state standards outside
the mixing zone.
One court recently considered the significance of mixing zones to
Puerto Rico's certification, pursuant to section 401, that an NPDES
permit issued by EPA would comply with Puerto Rico's WQSs.260 In
that case, Puerto Rico was in the process of reviewing its mixing zone
policy when EPA issued a new NPDES permit to a point source. This
new permit, unlike the prior permit, failed to provide expressly for the
applicability of a mixing zone to the determination of WQS compli-
ance, and the point source contended that the permit conditions
should have provided for such a mixing zone.2 61 The court noted that
states have reached varied conclusions because each state has discre-
tion to decide whether a mixing zone will apply when defining their
WQSs.262
258. See Water Pollution: Board Says Region IV Properly Determined Need for Total
Residual Chlorine Limit in Period, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1160 (Sept. 20, 1996) [hereinafter
Region IV Chlorine Limit] (reporting an EPA decision which held that the question of
whether discharges would violate WQSs depends on whether a mixing zone was to be used
at the point of the discharge).
259. See Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73, 75 (1st Cir. 1993). The court
described the significance of a mixing zone by stating that the concentration of a pollutant:
[C]ould be measured in the effluent itself-such as storm runoff or waste water-just as it drains into the stream, river or bay which is protected by the Clean
Water Act; alternatively, it could be measured at the edge of a defined area of the
receiving body of water after the pollutant has been diluted by that water.
Such a defined area is called a mixing zone, and it appears that measuring pollu-
tants at the edge of the mixing zone is widespread in the application of the Clean
Water Act.
260. Id.
261. See id.
262. See id. The court stated that:
According to an EPA publication, "[w]hether to establish such a mixing zone pol-
icy is a matter of State discretion." Practically every state and Puerto Rico have
adopted mixing zone criteria, although the criteria appear to differ widely. The
mixing zone concept is described in Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, which concludes
with the observation that "the 'mixing zone' determination is basically a cost-
[Vol. 24:393
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Adjudicating citizen suit claims of WQS violations will be made
substantially more complex if courts must make policy judgments re-
garding the applicability and effect of mixing zones. As with the issue
of compliance schedule applicability, courts will be relieved from hav-
ing to resolve this difficult policy-bound question if permitting agen-
cies have already made decisions about the use of mixing zones when
WQS compliance is made a permit condition.263 Permitting agencies
will not have made any such decision if WQS compliance is not in-
cluded as a permit condition.
In sum, significant institutional problems will confront courts if
they adjudicate citizen claims of WQS violations when WQS compli-
ance is not an NPDES permit condition. Even when WQS compli-
ance is a permit condition, however, deciding claims of WQS
violations may require courts to make difficult decisions that implicate
enforcement and implementation policy.
2. Fairness Problems
In addition to presenting courts with difficult judgments about li-
ability, citizen suits based on WQS violations are also likely to be per-
ceived as unfair by point sources that are subjected to such lawsuits.
This is in large part because, as Judge Kleinfeld discussed in his North-
west Environmental Advocate dissent, WQS violations may occur as
the result of upstream discharges from point and nonpoint sources.
264
Indeed, WQS violations may be caused by stream flow conditions
265
or upstream permit violations. 266 In each such circumstance, the
downstream point source is likely to argue vigorously that enforce-
ment of WQSs against it would be unfair.
EPA has occasionally established that WQS violations may occur
without regard to the level of pollutants discharged from a given point
source. 267 For example, EPA allows states to define water quality cri-
teria that are more stringent than background pollutant levels in the
benefit judgment on a given set of environmental facts, rather than any sort of
'scientific' determination." (citations omitted).
263. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
267. See NPDES TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 16, at 6-12 ("It is not possible to
guarantee, using permit limits, that a WLA will never be exceeded."); Alaska Ctr. for the
Env't v. Browner, 20 F.3d at 984 ("the EPA argues that even if it is required to establish
TMDLs [to limit point-source discharges], the actual quality of Alaskan waters will depend
in part upon discretionary acts of the State of Alaska with respect to non-point source
pollution."); see also S. REP. No. 103-33, (1993) ("The scientific community identified sig-
nificant impairments to the ecological integrity of waterbodies, mostly as a result of
nonpoint sources of pollution.").
1997]
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waterway.26 This policy can lead to an extreme case where degraded
water quality is the result of conditions beyond a permitted source's
control, and where even if the point source were discharging pure
water, conditions in the receiving waters would violate state WQSs. 2 6 9
This fairness problem is more acute when the point source in
question is complying with all limits and conditions included in its
NPDES permit than when the point source is violating an NPDES
permit condition directing it to comply with state WQSs. 2 70 If a point
source's NPDES permit does not mandate WQS compliance, the
source may be able to rely on recent decisions that require that a regu-
lated party be given "fair warning" before it can be held liable for a
violation of an environmental statute.271 Point sources with NPDES
permits that do not mandate WQS compliance could rely on these
decisions to argue that they should not be subject to citizen suits to
enforce state WQSs. A point source operating under an NPDES per-
mit that conditions discharges on WOS compliance would be unable
to make the same sort of fairness and "fair warning" arguments
against citizen suit enforcement. As a policy matter, therefore, fair-
ness concerns favor the NPDES condition dependent approach
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Northwest Environmental Advocate.
3. Inefficient Level of Enforcement
The final public policy objection made to allowing citizen suits
that are based on WQS violations is that too many enforcement ac-
268. See Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F.Supp. 733, 741 (D. N.M. 1993) ("The EPA
does not believe it is authorized to reject proposed standards because they are more strin-
gent than background levels. 56 Fed. Reg. 64,886 (1991).").
269. Cf. id. at 742, where the court discussed EPA's issuance of an NPDES permit to
Albuquerque's treatment works:
EPA is prepared to include limits in the City's NPDES permit to ensure that
discharged water at the facility outfall meets the water quality standards of the
downstream state without first concluding that the quality of the river water five
miles further downstream will be measurably improved. For example, the
Pueblo's arsenic standard for the Rio Grande is three orders of magnitude (1000
times) more stringent that the federal Safe Drinking Water Standard, and is be-
low the concentration that can be accurately measured by current laboratory
equipment. EPA will impose this stringent limit on the City despite the fact that
arsenic occurs naturally in Albuquerque's ground water at relatively high levels
and is not discharged to the water by industrial polluters. If pure water is dis-
charged at the City's outfall, it is possible that the arsenic levels in water flowing
through the Pueblo will remain relatively high.
270. But reconcile this view with that of the Supreme Court; Axline & McGinley, supra
note 119, at 285, where the authors quote from the Court's decision in EPA v. California ex
rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. that states, "[a]n NPDES permit serves to trans-
form generally applicable effluent limitations and other standards-including those based
on water quality-into the obligations (including a timetable for compliance) of the indi-
vidual discharger .... "
271. Roy S. Belden, Reinvigorating the Due Process Defense: EPA Required to Give
Fair Warning of Rules Interpretations, [1997] 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2449 (April 26, 1996).
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tions will result. Judge Kleinfeld raised this objection in his dissent in
Northwest Environmental Advocate.272 The objection was reiterated
by the dissenters to the denial of en banc review, who believed that
allowing citizen suits would burden the courts with too much new liti-
gation and result in overenforcement of state WQSs.
2 7 3
Landes and Posner considered the problem of overenforcement
in their study of private enforcement of law. They explained that an
important characteristic of maintaining a public monopoly on enforce-
ment is that it "enables the public enforcer in effect to nullify particu-
lar laws, or particular applications of law, simply by declining to
prosecute violators. '274 They argued that this "discretionary nonen-
forcement" has the important positive social value of limiting the ef-
fect of laws, that read literally would almost always be overinclusive.
Selective nonenforcement may also avoid punishment of "conduct
that the legislature or court that formulated the rule did not in fact
want to forbid. '275
Landes and Posner argued that if the public enforcer lacked dis-
cretion not to enforce the law, harm would likely result: "[i]f enforced
to the letter, an overinclusive rule could impose very heavy social
costs. '276 In the case of the Clean Water Act, the overenforcement
feared by the Northwest Environmental Advocate dissenters might
lead to point sources unfairly being held liable for WQS violations and
being forced to expend vast sums of money for new controls on pollu-
tion discharges. Landes and Posner also noted that the public en-
forcer's exercise of its discretionary nonenforcement authority can be
monitored and controlled by legislative oversight, while private en-
forcement of the law is not subject to the same check. 277
The fact that poor administration by the states and EPA have
caused WQSs to fail to provide any kind of effective limit on the dis-
272. See Northwest Envtl. Advocate, 56 F.3d at 993 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting), where
the judge made the following analogy:
A "public interest advocacy group," however, would have an incentive to ticket
all the automobiles going a few miles per hour over the limit, because the private
group, unlike the police officer and the judge, would have a financial incentive to
enforce against the large number of minor violators, even though the burdens of
enforcement would be very high relative to the improvement in public safety. A
zealous concern for safety on the highways would doubtless contribute to doing
well by doing good, but there would be too much good done.
273. See Northwest Envtl. Advocate v. Portland, 74 F.3d 945, 946 (9th Cir. 1996) (de-
nial of petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting)
("The result [in the case] promises to invite excessive, costly, and counterproductive citizen
suits, funded by the taxpayers, for the enforcement of standards that are imprecise and
astronomically costly to the municipalities affected.").
274. Landes & Posner, supra note 248, at 38.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 39-40.
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charge of pollutants for so long strongly suggests, under the Landes
and Posner analysis, that citizen enforcement of WQSs would be inef-
ficient. This implication arises because the failure of WQSs as effec-
tive supplementary controls on discharges is well documented and
long standing. Congress' failure to penalize EPA or the states for this
lack of WQS enforcement may indicate that Congress does not view
WQSs as an effective basis for controlling the discharge of pollutants
and tolerates discretionary nonenforcement by public officials. In this
event, allowing uncontrolled citizen enforcement would likely be
inefficient.2 78
Landes and Posner, however, also discussed what might be seen
as the flip side of discretionary nonenforcement: "selective or discrim-
inatory enforcement" by a public agency. 279 This enforcement ap-
proach is an "oppressive and inefficient feature of public law
enforcement"2 80 and results when the public enforcer turns a blind eye
to violations of the core mandates of a law. When the public enforcer
has a monopoly on enforcement authority, selective enforcement is
difficult to remedy.
In the context of the Clean Water Act, the Landes and Posner
analysis of private law enforcement leads to the question of whether
the public enforcers' twenty-five year failure to enforce WQSs by fail-
ing to incorporate more stringent effluent limitations into NPDES
permits has been a form of selective enforcement. It is difficult to
determine whether past public enforcement of WQSs is better charac-
terized as selective enforcement or discretionary nonenforcement.
This question is important, because, if the twenty-five year history is
determined to have been an example of selective enforcement, per-
mitting citizen suits to enforce WQSs might be an effective remedy for
the public enforcers' abuse of discretion.
To be sure, Congress initially expressed doubts over whether
WQSs would be helpful in limiting discharges into surface waters. 281
It has since failed to strengthen the Act's mandate that NPDES per-
mits include emissions limitations that are sufficiently stringent to en-
sure WQS compliance. Nevertheless, when Congress amended the
Clean Water Act in 1987 it did not retreat from, and indeed it in-
creased, the regulatory effect of WQSs.28 2 Moreover, in its recent in-
terpretations of the Clean Water Act, the Supreme Court has given
278. Citizen enforcement of WQSs might be controlled to some degree by courts,
which might require clear proof that otherwise permitted discharges from the defendant
point source actually caused the WQS violation. But see id. at 40.
279. Id. at 41.
280. Id.
281. See supra notes 228-233 and accompanying text.
282. See supra Part I.C.
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broad effect to state WQSs.283 Finally, both discretionary nonenforce-
ment and selective enforcement may flourish only when the public
enforcer holds a monopoly on enforcement authority. Prior discus-
sion illustrates that Congress did not provide for a public monopoly
over the enforcement of NPDES permit conditions. Those conditions
are the subject of private as well as public enforcement. 284 It accord-
ingly follows that when WQS compliance is a permit condition, the
permittee must conform to the condition, and noncompliance ought
to be subjected to private enforcement.
In sum, the cogency of the excessive enforcement critique
presented by the Northwest Environmental Advocate dissenters de-
pends to a significant degree on two considerations. First, the power
of the argument depends on whether Congress has established a pub-
lic monopoly over the enforcement of WQSs. This Article has already
shown that no monopoly exists in a case where WQS compliance is an
NPDES permit condition. In light of Congress' intent that private
parties have the right to enforce permit conditions, any contention
that such citizen suits amount to overenforcement ignores the core
requirements of the Act. Second, the cogency of the excessive en-
forcement critique is dependent on whether EPA administration of
the Clean Water Act during the preceding twenty-five years consti-
tutes discretionary nonenforcement or selective enforcement in cases
where there is a public monopoly on enforcement. This is a close
question. In cases where WQS compliance is not expressly required
for point source discharges, in the form of a permit condition or more
stringent effluent limitations, the balance weighs strongly in favor of
foreclosing citizen enforcement. In the latter cases, Congress has
seemingly decided that it will tolerate discretionary nonenforcement
by public agencies.
B. Public Policy Reasons for Citizen Suits Based on
WQS Violations
This Article now turns to an elaboration of the two primary rea-
sons supporting the availability of citizen suits to enforce WQSs: (1)
encouraging improved permit writing, and (2) maintaining the integ-
rity of the Clean Water Act. As with the arguments against citizen
suit enforcement, the relevance and strength of these public policy
concerns depend, to differing degrees, on whether WQS compliance is
a condition included in the source's NPDES permit. These arguments
support, as a matter of public policy, the Northwest Environmental
283. See generally PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. 91; Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
284. See supra Part V.A.
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Advocate court's statute-driven decision that citizen suit enforcement
should be available only when WQS compliance is a permit condition.
1. Deterring Flawed Permit Writing
Professors Axline and McGinley have argued that citizen en-
forcement mitigates many problems and shortcomings associated with
EPA enforcement of laws.2 85 Axline and McGinley further believe
that enforcement may improve administration and enforcement of the
Clean Water Act.2 86 The availability of citizen suits may serve the im-
portant role of inducing permit granting agencies to issue permits with
sufficiently stringent limitations on discharges. If permit writers are
confident that permit conditions may be enforced through citizen
suits, they may decide that requiring WQS compliance as a permit
condition is the most appropriate means to ensure that state water
quality will not be degraded. This may commonly be the case when
the permit is being drafted by EPA rather than by the state itself. Re-
quiring WQS compliance as a condition is also likely to be less bur-
densome for a permit writer than seeking to define and defend
specific effluent limitations. The WQS compliance condition may
come to be viewed by permit writers as a second best strategy for
preventing water quality degradation.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently had to decide
whether a citizen could bring an enforcement action based on a dis-
charge of pollution for which the source in question had not received
an NPDES permit.287 The source tried to defend its failure to obtain a
permit by claiming that EPA had not defined any applicable emissions
limitations for point source discharges of the pollutant.2 88 The court
decided, however, that the citizen suit claim was meritorious, based in
part on its view that Congress intended that point sources should not
285. See, e.g., Axline & McGinley, supra note 119, at 287 ("Citizen enforcement com-
pensates, to some extent, for EPA's inadequate resources. Citizen enforcement is also nec-
essary, however, because EPA is an agency, and like any agency it is subject to capture,
self-interested decisionmaking, and institutional agendas that differ from those of Con-
gress." (footnote omitted)).
286. Id. at 288. ("In the case of EPA's inadequate NPDES program, citizen suits pro-
vide an opportunity to achieve the enforcement that EPA has been unwilling or unable to
achieve, and at the same time strengthen EPA's regulatory hand.").
287. Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996). The source was
discharging produced water containing oil and grease without a permit. Produced water is
a by-product of mineral extraction. See id. at 550 n.1; see Washington Wilderness Coalition
v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 986 (E.D. Wash. 1994) ("a citizens suit to enforce an
'effluent limitation' can be based on allegations that the defendant is discharging without
an NPDES permit."); see also, Sierra Club, 73 F.3d at 562 ("numerous courts have allowed
suits by citizens against persons allegedly discharging pollutants without a permit, despite
the fact that the discharger was complying with applicable effluent limitations or that no
applicable effluent limitation was in place." (citations omitted)).
288. See 73 F.3d at 559.
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be able to evade the Clean Water Act's requirements simply because
an administrative agency has not met its obligation to implement the
statute effectively. 289 This case illustrates that citizen suits can effec-
tively supplement the administration of the Clean Water Act by en-
forcing the Clean Water Act's requirements in the absence of proper
agency administration. 290 The availability of citizen suits may en-
courage regulated point sources to demand that agencies issue permits
with comprehensive effluent limits in a timely manner. Point sources
will be eager to obtain such permits to ensure that they are able to
rely confidently on the Clean Water Act's permit shield provision.291
289. The court stated that:
[Wihile Congress's original intent may have been to limit citizen suits based on
unpermitted discharges to those instances where an applicable permit was avail-
able from the state or EPA, Congress's subsequent inaction evinces an intent to
allow such citizen suits even where the discharger's failure to obtain a permit can
be explained by administrative default.
Id. at 561. The court drew support for this result from a previous court of appeals decision
permitting the United States to enforce a CWA requirement, even though EPA had not
defined any national emissions limitations:
We see nothing impermissible with allowing the Government to enforce the Act
by invoking § 1311(a), even if no effluent limitations have been promulgated for
the particular business charged with polluting. Without this flexibility, numerous
industries not yet considered as serious threats to the environment may escape
administrative, civil, or criminal sanctions merely because the EPA has not estab-
lished effluent limitations. Thus, dangerous pollutants could be continually in-
jected into the water solely because the administrative process has not yet had the
opportunity to fix specific effluent limitations. Such a result would be inconsis-
tent with the policy of the Act....
Id. at 562 (quoting United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3rd Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980)).
290. Even in a case where a court held that it would be unfair to allow a point source to
be held liable for failure to obtain an NPDES permit, because the lack of a permit was the
sole fault of the permitting agency, the court recognized that the action would likely be
proper if the unpermitted discharges were causing a degradation in water quality. See
Hughey v. JMS Dev't Corp., 78 F.3d 1523, 1530 (11th Cir. 1996) (discussed infra Part
V.B.2.).
291. See Axline & McGinley, supra note 119, at 289, where the authors offer the fol-
lowing argument in support of the availability of citizen suits claiming that a source has
discharged a pollutant that is not identified in the NPDES permit:
Regulated industries are likely to prefer the devil they know to the devil they
don't know. If the discharge of pollutants not specifically authorized in an
NPDES permit exposes permit holders to citizen suits for violating section 301's
"no discharge without permission" requirement, those permit holders are likely
to be the first to ask EPA to broaden the scope of its NPDES program. Had EPA
comprehended this fact when it established its permit program, it might have
more aggressively pursued a universal program, and informed polluters who com-
plained about such a program that they faced even more undesirable conse-
quences from a limited program.
These authors believe that the permit shield, discussed supra notes IV.A.2, should be inap-
plicable when a permit granting agency fails to comply with the CWA in drafting the per-
mit. See Axline & McGinley, supra note 119, at 285 ("When permit writers fail to
'transform' general standards into specific standards tailored to individual pollutants, that
failure should not shield permit holders from lawsuits for discharging pollutants not ad-
dressed in their permit.").
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Note that the beneficial effects of citizen suit availability de-
scribed above appeared in the context of unpermitted discharges of
particular pollutants. Those benefits may not be quite as apparent in
the context of WQS enforcement. Unlike the situation where specific
pollutants are emitted in the absence of a permit authorizing their dis-
charge, claims of WQS violations can arise notwithstanding a point
source's compliance with its NPDES permit's effluent limits for the
pollutant causing the WQS violation. In the WQS context, therefore,
the central issue of permit administration is not whether an NPDES
permit has been issued authorizing a discharge, but whether the per-
mit contains sufficiently stringent emissions limitations or requires
WQS compliance as a permit condition.
Although allowing citizen suit enforcement of WQSs may induce
permit-issuing agencies to improve their permit administration by en-
suring that proper permit limitations are included, this inducement ar-
guably may not be necessary because alternate review mechanisms are
available to achieve that same result. The Clean Water Act provides
three alternative mechanisms for ensuring that the emissions limita-
tions included in an NPDES permit are stringent enough to ensure
that water quality is not degraded.
First, EPA now requires that all states allow affected persons to
challenge the effluent limitations included in a point source's NPDES
permit.292 Such review should help deter inadequate permitting be-
cause it involves an investigation of whether the permit is sufficiently
stringent to protect water quality. Deterrence is even more likely to
occur now that EPA regulations define how permitting agencies
should translate WQSs into effluent limitations. These regulations
will define an applicable review standard for determining whether the
permitting agency has acted reasonably in defining or declining to de-
fine more stringent limitations. 293
Second, a citizen may bring an action to compel EPA compliance
with the TMDL provision. That provision is intended to ensure that
permits for individual point sources include the discharge limitations
needed to meet state WQSs.294 Third, a citizen may bring an action to
compel compliance with the Toxic Hot Spots ICS provision added in
1987.295 That provision is intended to prevent toxic hot spots by en-
suring that NPDES permits contain sufficiently stringent effluent limi-
tations for toxic pollutants.296
292. 61 Fed. Reg. 20,972 (1996).
293. See generally note 119 supra and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 148-157 and accompanying text.
295. See U.S.C. § 1314(l)(3) (establishing nondiscretionary EPA duty).
296. See supra Part I.C.3.
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The availability of these alternative mechanisms for ensuring the
rigor of effluent limitations included in NPDES permits, helping en-
sure WQS compliance, weighs against the need for citizen suits to
serve as another such mechanism. On the other hand, allowing citizen
suit enforcement to ensure that point sources do not cause WQS vio-
lations when compliance is a condition of their NPDES permits does
provides an important and needed incentive for agencies to define
permit conditions with care.297 In this context, citizen enforcement
may play the kind of role that Professors Axline and McGinley have
advocated.298 Allowing WQS compliance to be enforced by citizens
when it is a permit condition may also provide interested citizens and
sympathetic state agencies with an important bargaining chip when
negotiating the details of NPDES permit requirements.
2. Preserving the Integrity of the Clean Water Act
In order to preserve the integrity of the Clean Water Act it is
extremely important that its mandates, such as NPDES permit re-
quirements, are enforced. Allowing citizen suits to enforce WQSs
when WQS compliance is a permit condition would help ensure that
all permit requirements are met and would, in this way, help preserve
the integrity of the Act.
The regulatory structure of the Clean Water Act depends on the
issuance of permits that impose effluent limitations and other condi-
tions on permitted point sources. EPA's guidance to permit writers
establishes two important principles regarding these permit condi-
tions. First, permit writers are required to include specific "standard
conditions" in all NPDES permits. 299 One of these mandatory condi-
tions is that: "The permittee must comply with all conditions of the
permit. Noncompliance is a violation of the [Clean Water Act] and is
grounds for injunctive relief, substantial monetary penalties, incarcer-
ation, changes or termination to the permit, or denial of permit re-
newal. ' 300 This condition gives clear warning to point sources
operating under NPDES permits that make WQS compliance an ex-
press condition that they are required to comply with "all" permit
conditions and undermines any argument they might make that they
were not aware of the obligation to comply with WQSs.
297. Agencies have discretion over whether to include WQS compliance as a permit
condition, except when WQS compliance is dictated by a state as part of section 401 certifi-
cation. See supra notes 210-212 and accompanying text.
298. This strong incentive is consistent with the notion that a permit and its conditions
establish legal obligations and should be drafted with care.
299. See NPDES TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 16, at 3-12.
300. Id. (restating 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(a)).
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EPA has also described the importance of other "special condi-
tions" included in NPDES permits. Special conditions "provide an
additional measure of control" and "foster compliance with poli-
cies. '30 1 When a special permit condition requires compliance with
WQSs, the statutory significance of the condition cannot be over-
stated. This is because the Clean Water Act expressly defines permit
"limitations or requirements" to include permit conditions30 2 and be-
cause a core intent of the Act is to ensure that water quality, as de-
fined by WQSs, is not degraded. 30 3 This is particularly true when a
state, exercising its independent authority over federal NPDES per-
mitting pursuant to the section 401 certification process, has mandated
that EPA include WQS compliance as a condition of a federal NPDES
permit.
A recent case will be useful in evaluating the importance of com-
plying with permit conditions barring degradation of receiving waters.
In Hughey v. JMS Development Corp. ,304 the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals reviewed the district court's decision that JMS Develop-
ment Corp. (JMS) had violated the Clean Water Act by discharging
storm water from its construction site without an NPDES permit.
Both sides agreed, however, that JMS had been unable to obtain the
required permit, through no fault of its own, because the state permit-
ting agency would not issue such a permit.305
The court held that, even though the discharges appeared to vio-
late the zero-discharge limit for unpermitted sources, that limit "pre-
supposes the availability of an NPDES permit, allowing for the
discharge of pollutants under the conditions set forth in the per-
mit."'306 Because JMS had no opportunity to obtain a permit to allow
its discharges, the court held that it would be unfair and improper to
hold JMS liable for violating the Clean Water Act.30 7 The court lim-
ited its holding, however, to situations where the discharge giving rise
301. See NPDES TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 16, at 3-14 stating that:
Ultimately, special conditions are designed to provide an additional measure of
control for the reduction of discharges to waters of the United States. As such,
the permit writers should not feel constrained to the special conditions discussed
above. In many cases, the special conditions section can be used to promote
Agency initiatives and to foster compliance with policies.
302. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(6). This provision is discussed supra at notes 206-209 and ac-
companying text.
303. See supra Part IV.C.
304. 78 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996).
305. See id. at 1524.
306. Id. at 1525 (citation omitted). Because the case involved neither a permit nor
applicable permit conditions, the case does not raise the same issues as a case in which
WQS compliance is a condition of a source's NPDES permit.
307. Id. at 1530. The case is therefore at odds with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Sierra
Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996), which is discussed supra notes
287-89, 242-44, and accompanying text.
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to the claimed violation had not degraded water quality. 308 The
court's dictum therefore confirms the importance of the antidegrada-
tion principle of the Clean Water Act. That dictum recognized that a
citizen suit may be proper when discharges from a point source de-
grade water quality, despite the fact that the source has been unable
to obtain an NPDES permit through no fault of its own. In the court's
view, therefore, the existence of actual harm to water quality trumps
the fact that the discharger is not responsible for the absence of a
permit. This reasoning would likely support allowing citizen suits for
WQS violations, regardless of whether a source's NPDES permit
makes WQS compliance a condition.
The problem with the broad construction of the citizen suit provi-
sion described above, however, is that it fails to recognize that it is
unfair to subject a point source to liability in a citizen action when the
source has complied with its NPDES permit and all of its conditions.
When, however, a point source has an NPDES permit that includes a
condition requiring WQS compliance, both the Clean Water Act's
core policies of nondegradation and permit compliance support al-
lowing citizen suit claims to be brought. In sum, in a situation in
which a permit condition proscribes the violation of WQSs and a
source's discharges are in fact improperly degrading water quality, the
integrity of the Act demands that citizen suit enforcement be available
to ensure permit compliance. If the permitting agency decides that it
does not wish to ensure WQS compliance by allowing supplemental
citizen suit enforcement, the agency need only refrain from including
WQS compliance as a condition of the permit.30 9 If it chooses this
course, the agency should, of course, ensure that the actual limits on
pollutant discharges are sufficiently stringent to ensure WQS
compliance.
308. See JMS Dev't Corp., 78 F.3d at 1530, where the court stated that:
The facts of this case necessarily limit our holding to situations in which the
stormwater discharge is minimal, as it was here. The district court found that
JMS's "discharges pose no threat to human health, and that much of the damage
[caused by such discharges] will be reversed with the passage of a relatively short
amount of time."
See also id. finding that:
[W]e hold that Congress did not intend (surely could not have intended) for the
zero discharge standard to apply when: (1) compliance with such a standard is
factually impossible; (2) no NPDES permit covering such discharge exists; (3) the
discharger was in good-faith compliance with local pollution control requirements
that substantially mirrored the proposed NPDES discharge standards; and (4) the
discharges were minimal.
309. The only exception to this would be when EPA, in issuing a federal NPDES per-
mit, is required by the source state's section 401 certification to include WQS compliance
as a permit condition. In that situation, the state has made the judgment that the condition
is, in fact, necessary to ensure that its surface water quality is not degraded.
1997]
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CONCLUSION
Twenty-five years of administration and enforcement of the
Clean Water Act have failed to protect water quality in the nation's
waters to the degree prescribed by states in their WQSs. Degraded
water quality persists, despite the Act's basic purpose and structure,
both of which theoretically mandate compliance with WQSs. One
mechanism for achieving greater WQS compliance, which has not yet
played a particularly important role, is the filing of citizen suits against
point sources to enforce WQSs.
The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Northwest Environmental
Advocate to allow such an action when WQS compliance is a condi-
tion of a source's NPDES permit may encourage interested parties to
take a second look at the citizen suit enforcement mechanism. The
decision should also encourage state agencies to consider imposing
WQS compliance as a special condition in point source NPDES per-
mits. That condition may be the second best solution, after specific
more stringent effluent limitations, to the problem of degraded sur-
face waters. This Article concludes that the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision employed an accurate interpretation of the Clean
Water Act and reflects good public policy. The authority to bring a
citizen suit should not, however, be extended to a case in which a
point source's NPDES permit does not include WQS compliance as a
condition. Allowing a citizen suit in that context is consistent with
neither the Clean Water Act nor good public policy.
Allowing citizen suits to ensure WQS compliance with when such
compliance is an NPDES permit condition may not, standing alone,
improve water quality significantly. After twenty-five years of failure,
optimism regarding WQS compliance would be wholly unwarranted.
This enforcement option may, however, be a useful negotiating point
for environmental groups and interested citizens. They may strongly
urge permit-issuing agencies to include WQS compliance as a required
permit condition when the agencies prove unwilling to include specific
more stringent limitations in NPDES permits. Failure to include
either the more stringent limitations or the WQS compliance condi-
tion, meanwhile, could be challenged directly. Once point sources re-
alize the significance of the WQS compliance condition, they may
cooperate with permitting agencies to define and implement appropri-
ate, more stringent limitations to replace the general WQS compli-
ance conditions in their NDPES permits. Point sources will be
motivated to cooperate with agencies because compliance with the
more stringent limitations included in their NPDES permits will shield
them from citizen suits based on any WQS violations that may occur.
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